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EUTHANASIA: A STUDY
IN COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL LAW
Helen Silving f
In Leland v. Oregon,' Mr. Justice Frankfurter said:
"However much conditions may have improved since 1905,
when William H. (later Mr. Chief Justice) Taft expressed his
disturbing conviction 'that the administration of the criminal law
in all the states in the Union (there may be one or two excep-
tions) is a disgrace to our civilization' (Taft, 'The Administration
of Criminal Law,' 15 Yale L. J. 1, 11), no informed person can
be other than unhappy about the serious defects of present-day
American criminal justice." 2
Concern about the state of our criminal law has led the American
Law Institute to renew its project of drafting a model penal code. In
planning a general reform of criminal law, it is most important to
proceed from a clear notion of the proper objects to be protected and
of the wide range of diversity in crime. In medieval law, punishment
was not meted out in proportion to the graveness of the crime. A
multitude of acts constituted capital offenses. The trend of modern
criminal law is to use punishment sparsely and discriminately. If we
are to have a "system" of criminal law rather than a loose collection
of crime and punishment, we must concern ourselves with the problem
of a sound diversification of crime in accordance with relevant dif-
ferences in the character of criminal acts and in accordance with the
relative graveness of each offense. This the Model Penal Code prom-
ises to do; fundamentals of punishment are to be revised in the light
of its purpose, criminal behavior redefined and crime reclassified in the
light of the actor's potential dangerousness to society.3
It has been noted that in contrast to the deplorable state of the
substantive criminal law in Great Britain and in the United States, con-
siderable progress has been made in this field in continental European
countries.4 The experience of continental Europe with a particular
t LL.B., Columbia University; J.D., D. Political Science, University of Vienna;
member of the New York Bar; Research Associate in Law, Harvard Law School.
1. 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
2. Id. at 802 (dissenting opinion).
3. See Wechsler, The Challenge of a Model Penal Code, 65 HAIRv. L. REv. 1097
(1952).
4. Donnelly, The New Yugoslav Criminal Code, 61 Y.LE L.J. 510 (1952).
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problem of criminal law may, indeed, prove stimulating to American
jurisprudential thought.
The problem chosen for study concerns a most controversial sub-
ject: euthanasia-the mercy-motivated killing of a human being. A
discussion of euthanasia affords an opportunity to deal with "motive,"
a topic which has been neglected in our criminal jurisprudence. In
this country, motive is only an evidentiary factor in criminal law. By
contrast, modem continental European codes of criminal law fre-
quently regard motive as a substantive element of crime. Considera-
tion of motive, in turn, brings into focus the entire personality of the
actor as a matter of perhaps greater significance than the objective
characteristics of the type of crime perpetrated by him.
Apart from the subjective element of altruistic motive which might
bear on the character of the actor and the extent of his blame-worthi-
ness, euthanasia raises the important problem of determining, in the
light of a particular social philosophy, the proper objects of criminal
protection and their correct classification in accordance with the degree
of protection they deserve. The most diverse acts have been referred
to under the common term "euthanasia." Many of them are perfectly
lawful under all systems of criminal law; some are of doubtful legality;
others constitute crimes of various descriptions.5 Euthanasia in the
5. The most harmless among the various forms of "euthanasia" consists in re-
lieving the pain of a patient doomed to die without shortening his life duration.
Barth refers to it as "pure" euthanasia. BARTH, EUTHANASiE 6 (1924). Even this
form of euthanasia, while lawful in all legal systems, raises certain theoretical legal
problems. In Germany, the Reichsgericht (the highest court of the German Reich
in civil and criminal matters) drew an apparently most artificial distinction between
application of pain relieving means not involving infringement of the bodily integrity
of the patient, and the use of means involving such infringement. An example of the
former is supplying the patient with pills which he takes himself; an example of the
latter is the use of injections. The first-mentioned type of treatment does not fall
within any statutory definition of crime; the second technically constitutes the crime
of bodily injury, but is justifiable on the ground of the express, tacit or presumptive
consent of the patient. See ENGISCH, EUTHANASIE TIND VERNICHTUNG LrEENSUN-
WERTEN LEBENS IN STRAFRECHTLICHER BELEUCHTUNG 4-5 (1948). The extent of
the patient's consent necessary to justify any medical treatment is discussed in a
decision of the Reichsgericht of March 3, 1943, Urt. d. Reichsgerichts v. 3 Maerz
1943 i. S.H. v. N. VII (VIII) 160/42, reported in [1943] Seufferts Archiv 81.
Consent to the insertion of a needle is not sufficient to justify an injection of a foreign
element into the body, but consent in general terms to "anything the physician may
do" would be interpreted as including consent to an injection.
The Swiss Penal Code specifically provides for the immunity of actions performed
in the discharge of a professional duty. Swiss PENAL CoDE art. 32 (Code effective
Jan. 1, 1942). This provision legalizes "pure" euthanasia. Under the prevailing
interpretation, the physician must in such cases observe in addition to the medical
rules also social rules; except in emergency cases, he must secure the consent of the
patient or his guardian. See Thormann and von Overbeck, ScHaEiZtIscHms
STRAFGESETZ UcH, 1 ALLGEmEINER Tan. 136 et seq. (1940).
Where the use of pain relieving devices may accelerate a certain death shortly
to be expected, administration of such devices is being justified on the ground of
"balancing interests." ENGISCH, op. cit. supra, at 5 et seq. The risk taken in this
instance is frequently compared to that taken in surgery applied for the purpose
of preserving life. The physician is allowed to take it when the interest in the
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sense of killing of an incurably ill person for the purpose of putting an
end to his suffering must be clearly distinguished from euthanasia in
the sense of destruction of life which is "not worth living" because it
is socially useless. Within the former category further distinctions
must be drawn between death resulting from non-feasance and by af-
firmative conduct, and between euthanasia with or without the consent
or request of the deceased. The example of "euthanasia" thus shows
the wide difference that may exist between acts which are seemingly
related to each other and are indeed referred to under the same name,
and thereby demonstrates the need for a sound diversification of crime.
Finally, when administered with consent or upon demand of the de-
ceased, euthanasia borders on two significant concepts of criminal law,
which bear both on motive and on the objective elements of criminal
behavior: assistance in suicide and the special crime of "homicide upon
request," which is unknown in Anglo-American law.
THE NEED FOR LAW REFORM
Certain recent instances of euthanasia-have evoked a considerable
measure of public sympathy. The feeling prevails that the manner in
which cases involving euthanasia are disposed of within our system
of law is inadequate, and there is an increasing demand for a law re-
form which would take into consideration the distinctive aspects of
euthanasia.6
When there is a voluntary killing of an incurably ill person based
upon an altruistic motive, the act usually is performed with premedita-
tion and deliberation, and thus, within our legal system, constitutes the
gravest type of homicide, murder in the first degree.' In some juris-
expected result is greater than that in avoiding the risk involved. Thereby, the
degree of probability plays an important role; the risk may be taken when it is
small in comparison to the degree of certainty and the benefit of the result to be
achieved. Of course, the theory of "balancing interests" advanced as a basis for the
use of pain relieving devices which may accelerate death implies that the requirement
of preserving life is not absolute. Yet, the propriety of administering such devices
is hardly ever questioned.
The next stage in the development of the euthanasia idea is voluntary causation
of death based on an altruistic motive. This is the type of euthanasia discussed in
the text of this Article.
Finally, medical experiments on human beings have been also occasionally labeled
as "euthanasia." See WEIZSArcxE, EUTHANASIE UND MENSCHENVERSUCHE 12-13
(1947). They involve jeopardy of human life in the service of "humanity." The
problems raised by such experiments are manifold. They range from permissibility
of self-experiments of physicians to remission of penalty in exchange for a criminal's
offer of his body for such experiments. Famous victims of medical self-experiments
were Billroth and Robert Koch.
6. See text at note 169 and note 169 infra.
7. For citation and discussion of the statutes which adopt the classification
into first and second degree murder, see Keedy, A Problem of First Degree Murder:
Fisher v. United States, 99 U. OF PA. L. REv. 267 (1950).
Of course, a case may be construed in which a physician, spontaneously, swept
by compassion with the sufferings of a patient, causes his death in order not to see
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dictions this classification is further extended to acts which consist of
merely aiding a suicide, e.g., by supplying him with poison which he
could not otherwise secure.
8
Various devices are being used to circumvent the harshness of
this result. Frequently mercy killers are not indicted.9  At times,
they are indicted and convicted of a lesser crime than that justified un-
der statutory law, and put on probation. Thus, in the Repouille case"0
the accused, who killed his idiotic, malformed child, was indicted for
manslaughter in the first degree, and the jury brought in a verdict of
manslaughter in the second degree with a recommendation of the "ut-
most clemency"; 1' the judge sentenced the defendant to not less than five
nor more than ten years, execution to be stayed, and placed him on
probation. Another devise used in such cases consists in shifting the
issue, so that the case is ultimately decided not on the ground of mo-
tive but on some other ground, such as lack of causation or temporary
insanity. In the widely publicized New Hampshire case of State v.
Sander," a physician who dictated into the hospital record a state-
ment that he had injected ten cubic centimeters of air four times into
the veins of an incurably-ill, suffering cancer patient and that "she ex-
pired within ten minutes after this started," was acquitted by a jury
of charges that he murdered "in an act of mercy," on the ground that
there was no sufficient proof of causation; the trial judge had stated
at the very outset that the question of mercy killing could not legally be
an issue at the trial. In Connecticut, Carol Paight, a college girl, was
indicted for second degree murder, carrying a mandatory life sentence,
for the killing of her hospitalized father who was fatally ill from cander;
she was acquitted by a jury on the ground of temporary insanity at the
him suffer. Absent deliberation, the case might not be characterized as murder in
the first degree. But is such action ethically less objectionable than that of a
physician who, acting at the request of the patient, after mature deliberation and
careful weighing of his medical chances, arrives at the conclusion that there is no
hope of recovery or of pain relief for him, and thereafter, guided by such sympathy,
applies euthanasia in accordance with what the physician regards as his medical
conscience? Weizsaecker emphasizes that a physician should never be guided by
compassion, which is an essentially egoistical sentiment, but should at all times apply
a dispassionate and impersonal scientific judgment. WzIzsAEcKER, op. cit. mupra
note 5.
8. People v. Roberts, 211 Mich. 187, 178 N.W. 690 (1920).
9. On this point see the material cited in 48 MIcH. L. REv. 1199, 1200 (1950).
10. See the statement of the facts of this case as recited in the opinion of Judge
L. Hand in Repouille v. United States, 165 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1947). The federal
courts were concerned with the case in connection with Repouille's petition for
naturalization. His crime, for which he served no sentence, was held to be a crime
involving moral turpitude for purposes of naturalization.
11. As noted by Hermann Mannheim, juries in England will sometimes find an
offender not guilty in spite of sufficient evidence to the contrary. MANqNHEIM,
CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION 14 (1946).
12. State v. Sander (N.H. 1950), N.Y. Times, March 10, 1950, p. 1, col. 6; 48
MIcif. L. REv. 1197.
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time of the commission of the act.'" In Michigan, Eugene Braunsdorf,
a symphony musician, was acquitted by reason of insanity in the mercy
killing of his crippled adult daughter who had required hospitalization
all her life.'
4
Whatever the legal bases on which Sander, Paight and Braunsdori
were acquitted, the public will always look upon them as mercy killers.
Indeed, the use of legal technicalities in their acquittal tends to give
laymen the impression that the law is a magic formula rather than an
honest tool of meting out justice. Public confidence in the administra-
tion of criminal justice is hardly strengthened when moral issues are
shifted instead of being solved, or when the law relegates to juries
the function of correcting its inequities.
Also to be considered is the fact that the system prevailing at
present does not afford equality of treatment of mercy killers. Thus, in
the same year in which Miss Paight and Mr. Braunsdorf were acquitted,
Harold Mohr, indicted in Allentown, Pennsylvania, for the mercy kill-
ing of his blind, cancer-stricken brother, was convicted of voluntary
manslaughter and sentenced to from three to six years in prison and
$500 fine, even though he also pleaded temporary insanity and even
though, in contrast to the other cases, there was in the Mohr case evi-
dence that the accused had killed his brother upon the latter's urgent
and repeated requests."
As may be seen from the public reaction demonstrated whenever
mercy killers are on trial,'" there is a need for a law reform. Such need
must be more specifically evident to the legal profession whose particu-
lar concern it should be that justice be distributed equally.
INDIVIDUALISTIC VERSUS COLLECTIVISTIC CONCEPT OF CRIMINAL LAW
Ours is an individualistic legal system.' 7 We believe that man is
endowed with an innate personal dignity and that he is an end in himself
13. See report of case in N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1950, p. 1, col. 2.
14. See report of case in N.Y. Times, May 23, 1950, p. 25, col. 4.
15. See report of case in N.Y. Times, April 4, 1950, p. 60, col. 4; April 8, 1950,
p. 26, col. 1; April 11, 1950, p. 20, col. 5. The difference in the result in these cases
was not necessarily due to a difference in the laws of Connecticut, Michigan and
Pennsylvania. For authorities on Pennsylvania law see Keedy, Irresistible Impulse
as a Defense in the Criminal Law, 100 U. OF PA. L. REV. 956, 983 n.185 (1952).
The relatively lenient sentence imposed upon Mohr was due to the fact that the
jury had recommended mercy. In sentencing the defendant, the judge pointed out
that the defendant had acted as a martyr and must suffer punishment as the price of
martyrdom.
16. See particularly the newspaper reports on the cases of Sander and Paight
in notes 12, 13 supra.
17. On the distinction between the individualistic and the collectivistic approach
to euthanasia and to criminal law problems in general, see MANNHEIM, op. Cit.
supra note 11, at 14, 18-19.
EUTHANASIA
and not a mere means serving extraneous social ends, such as those of
the state, or even those of fellow human beings. This implies that
there can be no exculpation or reduction of penalty in cases in which
death is administered for the benefit of a person or a number of per-
sons, however large, other than the suffering patient."8 Respect for
human dignity, furthermore, implies recognition of the human will as
a value. From this recognition follows the decisive significance of the
patient's consent or request in the evaluation of euthanasia cases.
The statement made above invites the obvious rejoinder that, as
witnessed by capital punishment and war legislation, our laws do in
some instances place the welfare of society (or of the individuals com-
posing society) above that of the particular individual involved. It is
believed, however, that in an individualistic society 19 all such pro-
visions are based on a cooperative philosophy, which is not applicable
to the deliberate sacrifice of an innocent human being for the benefit of
the community.
The deliberate killing of a human being for the benefit of other
human beings is an instance of necessity killing, which is repugnant to
the common law. 0 True, the problem of euthanasia as necessity killing
at times arises in intricate situations where reasonable men may differ
on the proper course to be taken. It should be remembered, however,
that the fundamental issue involved in all such situations is the same:
whether the life of one human being can ever be said to be less valuable
18. This notion does not necessarily imply the converse argument that killing
is justified merely because it serves the interests of the patient. Cf. State v. Ehlers,
98 N.J. Law 236, 240-41, 119 Atl. 15, 17 (Ct. Err. & App. 1922).
19. Of course, no society can be perfectly individualistic. Cf. Silving, The Con-
flict of Liberty and Equality, 35 IowA L. REv. 357 (1950).
20. The principal authority for this proposition is an English case, Regina v.
Dudley and Stephens, 15 Cox C.C. 624, 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884). An earlier American
case, United States v. Holmes, 26 Fed. Cas. 360, No. 15,383 (E.D. Pa. 1842),
contains dicta which would seem to indicate approval of a limited right of necessity
killing. In that case, a sailor, upon orders of his mate, threw overboard certain
passengers when it appeared that all persons aboard would perish unless some were
destroyed. He was "charged with 'unlawful homicide,' as distinguished from that
sort which is malicious." Id. at 363. His defense was that the homicide was neces-
sary for self-preservation. Mr. Dallas, speaking for the prosecution, stated the
applicable rule to be as follows: "The law regards every man's life as of equal value.
It regards it, likewise, as of sacred value. Nor may any man take away his
brother's life, but where the sacrifice is indispensable to save hisown." Id. at 363.
The accused was convicted on the ground that as a sailor he owed a duty to the
passengers. The court indicated that apart from such duty, where two men struggle
for the only means of survival, each has a natural right to save himself at the
expense of the other. For approval of a limited right of necessity killing, see HALL,
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 399 (1947); MORELAND, THE LAW OF
HoMIcmE 257-58 (1952).
On the other hand, the immunity of abortion for medical reasons is, strictly
speaking, not an instance of permissible necessity killing in our legal system, for at
common law an unborn child was not regarded as a human being. See Evans v.
People, 49 N.Y. 88 (1872).
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than that of another. This may be best demonstrated by the history of
the German experience with necessity killing.
"Destruction of Life not Worth Living"
Necessity killing for the benefit of the community is known in Ger-
man legal and medical literature under a term coined by Karl Binding:
"destruction of life not worth living." This phrase is used to describe
not the patient's own attitude toward life but his objective uselessness
to the community. Binding primarily favored destruction of institu-
tionalized idiots by state action for the purpose of relieving society of a
burden.2 The project was popular with large segments of the German
public. 22  It was later developed by Hitler into his notorious program
of mass destruction of mental patients, which had to be revoked by
Hitler upon overwhelming public protest.2 German post-war decisions
condemned the killing of insane persons whose "killing was licensed"
by the Nazi regime "because their life was of no 'value'," as "killing
in the service of a cynical utilitarianism" rather than "assistance
rendered to the incurably ill." 24 These decisions stated it to be axio-
matic that the life of no person, however "useless," may be sacrificed
for the benefit of any person, however "useful," or for the benefit of
21. BINDING & HOCHE, DIE FREIGABE DER VERNICHTUNG LEBENSUNWERTEN
LEBENS (1920). It should be noted that the idea of Binding and Hoche was not
new. Men like Luther subscribed to a similar one; when seeing a twelve year
old boy who "tot voravit, quot quatuor rustici, -t nihil aliud fecit, quam ut ederet
et cacaret . . .Lutherus suasit, ut suffocaretur. Aliquis interrogatus: Ob quam
causam-Respondit: Quia ego simpliciter puto esse massam carnis sine anima .
8 TIScaREDEn No. 5207 (Clemen ed.).
22. A poll conducted by the psychiatrist Meltzer in 1920 showed 73 per cent of
parents and guardians of mentally deficient children favoring extermination of such
children. METZER, DAS PROBLEM DEE ABKUERZUNG "LEBENSUNWERTEN LEBENS"
95 (1925). Binding's theory was eulogized by many writers as heroic. See, e.g.,
Bresler, Karl Bindings Letzte Tat, 22 PSYCH.-NEuROL. WocHnxscHnmF 283 et seq.
(1920-21) and 23 id. at 4 et seq. On the other hand, it was also vigorously attacked,
particularly by religious writers. See, for instance WALTER, DIE EUTHANASIE UND
DIE HEiLIGEETr DES LEBENS (1935). The fact that Binding died before publication
of his book was interpreted by adherents as surrounding his project with an atmos-
phere of heroism, by opponents as expression of Divine justice.
23. On the Nazi practice of euthanasia see MrrsCHmU.ICH AND MIMXE, DAS
DIETAT DER MENSCHENVERACHTUNG (1947). By authority of an informal letter,
bearing no address, signed by Hitler, 275,000 persons were killed as "useless eaters."
See Judgment of the International Tribunal rendered in the case of the Minister of the
Interior Frick, in 22 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRmINALs BEFoRE THE INTE~RA-
TIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, Proceedings of Sept. 30, 1946, at 490, 491, and Proceed-
ings of Oct. 1, 1946, at 546, 547 (Secretariat of the Tribunal 1948).
It should be noted that the Nazis rejected euthanasia in the form of "mercy
killing" for the benefit of the patient as based on an individualistic social attitude.
See REPORT ON THE WORK OF THE OFFICIAL COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL LAW
(Guertner ed. 1936). Cf. DAS KOMMENDE DEUTSCHE STRAFRECHT c. 21, at 375
et seq.
24. Judgment of the Criminal Division of the Appellate Court of Frankfurt
a.M., Aug. 12, 1947, in the case of Dr. Schmidt, Ss 92/47, HOEHSTRICHTERLICHE
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN-STRAFSACHEN, 68 et seq. (Kleine, Schilling, Duden ed. 1948).
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any number of persons." Nevertheless, in passing upon one of the
numerous acts of alleged "euthanasia" performed by order of the Nazi
government, the Appellate Court of Muenster developed a somewhat
complex notion which, despite the court's disclaimer, is an outgrowth
of the concept of necessity killing2
The accused physician participated in the Nazi euthanasia action
by serving on a committee which selected the victims. He claimed that
he agreed to serve solely for the purpose of saving at least some of the
patients entrusted to his care by releasing them as cured, contrary to
facts, and by striking names from the lists of those doomed to die.
While holding both "necessity" - and "extralegal necessity" 28 inap-
plicable to the case, the court stated that the accused may have earned
a "personal immunity" if he participated in the action of killing "ex-
clusively for the purpose of stopping, disturbing and limiting it," if he
was "capable of carefully examining the situation," if his participation
was "based on such examination," if his entire participation "from his
first decision until termination of the participation" was "guided solely
by the desire of stopping the action to the best of his ability-not as
judged by the standards of the issued directives," if he had "availed
25. Judgment of the Criminal Division of the Appellate Court of Muenster,
March 5, 1949, in the case of Dr. P., St. S 19/49, in 1 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES
OBzRsTEN GmuCHTSHOFES FUER DIE BarriScHE ZONE IN STRAFSACHEN 321 (1949).
26. See note 25 supra. The decision of the Muenster court is of general juris-
prudential interest. The case demonstrates the reality value of Professor Fuller's
hypothetical case, The Case of the Spelutwean Explorers, 62 HARv. L. Rnv. 616
(1949).
27. The concept of "necessity" (Notstand) under German law is defined in
§54 of the Penal Code:
"Apart from the case of self-defense, an act does not constitute a crime where
it was committed in a state of necessity in order to rescue the actor or his relative
from an imminent danger to life or limb, provided that the necessity was not caused
by the fault of the actor and could not be otherwise removed."
28. "Extralegal necessity" (uebergesetzlicher Notstand) is not a statutory concept
but the product of decisional law. Where an action which bears all the characteristics
of a crime is the only means of preserving a legally protected interest or fulfilling
a duty imposed or recognized by law, the Reichsgericht held it not to be unlawful
to fulfil the superior duty at the expense of the inferior one or to protect a more
valuable interest at the expense of an interest of lesser value. 61 Decisions of the
Reichsgericht in Criminal Matters 242 (hereinafter R.G. St.). However, the offender
will not be excused unless he conscientiously considers whether the situation with
which he is faced presents a conflict of interests, protected by law, that cannot be
solved except by violation of one of them. 62 R.G. St. 138; 64 R.G. St. 104.
Conscientious consideration of the conflict involved is essential. Thus, the
Bundesgerichtshof, the highest court of the German Federal Republic (Bonn Re-
public) in civil and criminal matters, in a decision of Jan. 15, 1952, in 2
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESGERIcHTSHOFES IN STRAFSACHEN, herausgegeben von den
Mitgliedern des Gerichtshofes und der Bundesanwaltschaft 112 (hereinafter
B.G.H. St.), refused to excuse a physician who performed an abortion on deceased
in ignorance of the fact that she suffered from a disease which, under the law,
justified an interruption of pregnancy. The court said that, not knowing of the
existence of a state of extralegal necessity, the accused could not have considered
and weighed the conflicting interests involved.
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himself fully and without exception of every possibility accessible to him
to save patients," if his intention was "accompanied by action," and if
such action was "successful." The court based such "personal im-
munity" not on any particular provision of law but rather on a "super-
statutory ground excluding guilt." It derived that ground from the
general philosophy underlying certain provisions of German criminal
law, such as capital punishment, war legislation, self-defense and neces-
sity. It pointed out that, although the instinct of self-preservation, re-
lied on in justification of self-defense and necessity, is a factor of ques-
tionable ethical value, nevertheless German law, within defined limits,
takes notice of this elemental instinct even in cases of infringement upon
the life and integrity of innocent persons.
The Bundesgerichtshof reversed this decision,29 rejecting the doc-
trine of personal immunity enunciated by the lower court. The con-
cepts of "necessity" and "extralegal necessity," from which that court
derived its ultimate notions-the Bundesgerichtshof said-are based
on the idea of "the lesser evil," which originated in rules of law for the
protection of property and which is inapplicable to the branch of law
concerned with the protection of life; for the value of two lives can-
not be compared in the same manner as the value of material assets.
Nor may "superstatutory grounds excluding guilt" be considered
where the physician could simply avoid responsibility by rejecting
appointment, but instead chose to set himself up as a judge over life
and death. However, the court held that the problem of "necessity
killing in the presence of common danger" for the purpose of saving as
many lives as possible is a highly controversial subject, so that the
physician could have erred concerning the applicable law. The court,
therefore, remanded the case for a finding whether the physician pos-
sessed "consciousness that the act was wrongful," since such conscious-
ness, under German law, is a prerequisite of guilt."0
In Anglo-American law no one can, on the plea of necessity, ex-
cuse himself for taking the life of an innocent person.3 It is believed
that this rule should be preserved. There should be neither exculpa-
tion nor reduction of penalty where death is administered for the bene-
fit of any person or persons other than the suffering patient. Any
29. Decision of the Bundesgerichtshof rendered Nov. 28, 1952, (B.G.H. Urt. v.
28 Nov. 1952), 4 St. R. 23/50 (SchwurGer. Muenster i.W.), [1953] Neue Juristische
Wochenschrift 513 (hereinafter N.J.W.).
30. Since the historic decision of the Great Senate for Criminal Matters of the
Bundesgerichtshof, March 18, 1952 (2 B.G.H. St. 194), the German law recognizes
error of law as a defense. Such error may result in total exculpation or in a dis-
cretionary reduction of penalty, depending on whether it was "insuperable" or could
have been avoided by the actor had he properly "exerted his conscience."
31. Compare text at note 20 and note 20 supra.
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project of a future reform of the law on euthanasia should include this
essential limitation.
The Significance of Consent; Inability to Express Consent;
Euthanasia by Non-Feasance
As noted above, in certain cases of mercy killing to which the pub-
lic reacted most sympathetically there has been no showing that the
patient asked to be relieved of a painful life: It is believed, however,
that in determining the graveness of the act of mercy killing, within the
spirit of an individualistic philosophy, consideration is due to the pa-
tient's own attitude toward the act. A sharp distinction should be
drawn between euthanasia administered with the consent, or upon the
express request, of the patient and euthanasia performed without his
consent. Only where administered upon request, or at least with the
consent of the deceased, can euthanasia be deemed comparable to as-
sistance in suicide, which is often treated more leniently than oger
cases of homicide.
However, there are instances in which the patient is actually or
legally incapable of expressing a desire. This factor deserves particular
consideration where euthanasia consists in non-feasance rather than in
active conduct. A highly individualistic philosophy of criminal law
draws a distinction between active conduct and non-feasance. It does
not, for instance, impose a general affirmative duty of rendering assist-
ance to a person in peril.8" The affirmative duties it imposes are rare
and specific. The problem arises whether, where there is a specific duty
to act, failure to do so should be regarded, under exceptional circum-
stances such as those which might occasion euthanasia, as equivalent
to an affirmative act. A physician bound, by virtue of his employment
contract, to prolong the patient's life to the best of his ability, might
abstain from applying so-called analeptic medicine in the case of an
incurably ill, suffering patient. Of course, no analeptic means may be
applied under any conditions against the will of the patient, and a prob-
lem arises only where the patient is unable to give or to refuse consent.
According to Schoenke, "the physician's failure to prolong arti-
ficially an expiring painful life by applying stimulants, such as camphor
injections, is not regarded as homicide" under German law.8 Cer-
tain obiter statements of German courts justify the assumption that
they would follow this rule. In holding inaction resulting in death
to be punishable manslaughter where there is a duty to act, the
32. For provisions imposing such duty, see notes 94, 104 infra.
33. ScHoENxE, STRAFGEsErzBucH, KOMMENTAR 565 (6th rev. ed. 1952).
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Bundesgerichtshof 4 emphasized that the victim was not incurably ill.1
5
It pointed out that, where the crime consists of non-feasance rather than
of active conduct, the motive of the accused-the purpose of inaction-
is of increased significance. The issue of the legality of inaction by a
physician has not been decided by our courts. However, as in German
law, so under our system of jurisprudence, where there is a duty to act,
deliberate non-feasance with intent to cause death is, as a rule, punish-
able homicide. 6
The physician's dilemma is further complicated where the patient's
immediate illness is not incurable but where a cure will leave him a
permanent sufferer. Examples of such complication are: a patient
suffering from an incurable mental disease who contracts an acute
intervening illness, such as an appendicitis; a patient unconscious as a
result of an accident who, when "saved" will wake up to the realization
of "enormous misery"; a patient suffering from a brain disease which,
when cured, will leave a mental defect.3 Should life in such cases be
artfficially prolonged? Our law seems to require it. Yet inaction in
such cases, when motivated by the physician's desire not to prolong the
patient's suffering, is clearly distinguishable from active mercy killing.
One might argue that, since the physician's duty to act is contractual
and predicated upon the patient's consent, there being no basis in such
instances for presumptive consent, non-feasance should go completely
unpunished even though active euthanasia remains punishable.
MERCY AS MOTIVE OF HOmICIDE
As a result of vigorous reform movements, the criminal law of
several continental European countries is in the course of changing its
orientation. The basic concept of the conventional systems of criminal
law is the concept of "crime," and the basic classification is that into
different "types of crime" or "types of criminal act." Modem reform
movements rather center around the personality of the criminal, the
34. The highest court of the Federal Republic of Germany (the Bonn Republic)
in civil and criminal matters.
35. Decision of Bundesgerichtshof, Feb. 12, 1952, 2 B.G.H. St. 150. For a de-
tailed discussion of this significant case see text at notes 94, 101-04 infra.
36. In some jurisdictions it is classified as murder. Commonwealth v. Hall,
322 Mass. 523, 78 N.E.2d 644 (1948) (failure of a mother to feed a newly born
baby) ; Pallis v. State, 123 Ala. 12, 26 So. 339 (1899) (abandoning an infant child
held assault with intent to murder). Most often, however, neglect of a duty to act
resulting in death is considered as manslaughter. Territory v. Manton, 8 Mont 95,
19 Pac. 387 (1888) (husband's failure to provide medical care for his wife). No
case could be found dealing specifically with a physician's failure to prolong a patient's
life where by virtue of the employment contract there was a duty to act.
37. The first two of these hypothetical cases are discussed by Binding, see
BINDING & HocHE, op. cit. supra note 21, at 33; the last mentioned one is discussed
by ENGrscH, op. cit. supra note 5, at 10.
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"type of actor." "8 The term "type of actor" does not suggest assump-
tion of the existence of special types of individuals naturally inclined
to commit certain crimes, but rather directs the judge's attention to
the fact that he must consider the total personality of the actor, as evi-
denced by his deed 9 The actor's character, his dangerousness or
harmlessness, the probability or improbability of his repeating the crime
become important elements in judging the crime. These elements are
believed to be reflected in psychological guilt rather than in the conse-
quences of the act.4°
The concept of "guilt" has been subjected to a stringent analysis.
In the course of such analysis, the notion has gained ground that the
most significant test of guilt may be found not in the rational attitude
of the actor toward the crime but rather in the ethical evaluation of
the actor's motivation and in the manner of performance. 41 Thus, mo-
38. An outward expression of the change of 'orientation is the replacement
in the German Penal Code of the conventional terms "murder" and "manslaughter"
by the terms "murderer" and "manslayer."
39. On problems arising from the conflict of the idea of punishment based on
"dangerousness" of the actor and that of punishment based on "guilt," see MAURAcHE,
DEUTSCHES STRAFREcHT, ALLGEmEINER TEn. 35 et seq., 696 et seq. (1954). With
respect to the ideas underlying the reform of certain provisions of German criminal
law discussed in this Article, see SCHOENKE, op. cit. supra note 33, at 564.
In this Article considerable space will be devoted to German ideas on the
reform of criminal law. In this context, it is important to note that, while many
of the new ideas were incorporated into the law. during the Nazi regime, the re-
form movement originated long before the Nazi era and was not rooted in Nazi
ideology. See Huelle (Justice of the Bundesgerichtshof of the Bonn Republic),
Strafrechtsreform und kein Ende?, [1953] N.J.W. 1778-79. In addition, the code
was considerably revised in the post-war period, and was republished in its entirety
in 1953. Provisions bearing a Nazi imprint have been eliminated.
40. Stress on guilt is expressed in two principles: 1. that there must be no
criminal responsibility unless there is guilt, 'in the form of either intent or "at least'
negligence; 2. that responsibility attaches to guilt regardless of the consequences of
the act. A most interesting provision enacted in accordance with the first principle
is § 56 of the German Penal Code, added Aug. 25, 1953 (text of Sept. 1, 1953,
B.G. Bl. pt. I, at 1083), which reads as follows:
"Where the law attaches a higher penalty to a special consequence of the act,
such higher penalty shall not be imposed upon the actor unless he caused that
consequence at least negligently."
Perhaps the best illustration of the application of the second principle may be found
in a recent decision of the Swiss Supreme Court holding purported acts of abortion
performed on a non-pregnant woman punishable as attempted abortion. Bruderer v.
Staatsanwaltschaft des Kantons St. Gallen, Kassationshof, Sept. 1950, 76 ENT-
SCHEIDUNGEN DES ScHwEIZERISCEEN BUNDESGEMICHTS pt. IV, at 153 (Amtliche
Sammlung) (these official reports hereinafter cited B.G.E.). This decision and 74
B.G.E. pt. IV, at 65 overruled 70 B.G.E. pt. IV, at 9, 152.
In Germany, independence on result, as expressed in the revised provisions on
instigation of crime (§ 49a), leads to such extreme positions as that criticized by
Dreher, Das Dritte Strafrechtsaenderungsgesetz, JuRis zErruNG 421 (1953). A
person who, unsucessfully, instigates another to commit a street robbery is punish-
able more severely than a person who, successfully, instigates a simple robbery.
For discussion of the history of the notion of "guilt" and its recent development,
see MAURACH, SCHULD UND VERANnVORTUNG IMs STRArREcHT (1948); BuscH,
MODERNE WANDLUNGEN DER VERBRECHENSLEHRE (1949).
41. DALCKE, STRaAFRECET UND STRAvEAHREX, comment to German Penal Code
§ 211, at 148 n.2 (35th rev. ed. 1950).
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tive becomes relevant, whereas the premeditation and deliberation test
decreases in importance or disappears entirely.' It is being recognized
that "a man may act with deliberation while in a state of utmost de-
spair,"43 while "a crime of passion . . . can originate in a depraved
mind or be committed in a highly reprehensible manner." " The type
of motive which determines the act is believed to bear on the character
of the actor and thus to afford the best guide for predicting whether or
not he will repeat the act. It is believed that one who kills for profit
may be expected to do so again, whereas a mercy killer is hardly likely
to turn into an habitual criminal. On the other hand, premeditation is
not deemed to indicate, in itself, probability that the actor will repeat
the crime.
In contrast to the substantive use of motive and the waning im-
portance of the premeditation and deliberation test in modem European
codes,4" the test remains part of our law,4" though subject to sharp crit-
icism,4 7 and motive has only evidentiary use. As has been noted,
most cases of euthanasia would meet the requirements of the premedi-
42. In some codes the test has been entirely abandoned; in others its significance
has been considerably reduced. For a collection of the pertinent provisions (some
of which, however, are no longer in force) see GsovsKi, THE STATr0y CRImINAi
LAW OF GERMANY, WITH COMMENTS 126 et seq. (1947). The element of motive
in murder was stressed in Switzerland by Stooss (ScHwFAzFscHES SvaAFGEsnTrzucH,
VORENTWURF MIT MOTIVEN 147 (1894)) and Hafter (ScHwEizErscHEs STAFRECHT
15 et Yeq. (1943)) ; see also HAFrER, LEHRBUCH DES SCHWEIZmuSCHEN STRAFRECHTS,
ALLGEMEINER TElL 352 et seq. (2d ed. 1946). Stooss pointed out particularly that
"premeditation" is not a popular test whereas people react very strongly to "vile
motives."
43. Pfenninger, Zehn Jahre Schweizerisches Strafgesetzbuch, ScHwEIZERIsCHE
JURISTEN-ZEITUNG 217-24, 237-40 (1953).
44. DALC E, op. cit. supra note 41, at 148.
45. See text at note 42 and note 42 supra.
46. On the desirability of considering motive in American law see Michael &
Wechsler, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide II, 37 COL. L. REv. 1261, 1277
et seq. (1937).
47. How inadequate the test is may be best shown by a series of cases dealing
with the distinction between murder in the first degree and murder in the second
degree adjudged by our courts. In United States v. Parelius, 83 F. Supp. 617, 618
(D. Hawaii 1949), the court said:
"Experience has shown that juries are many times perplexed in reaching a
decision as to first or second degree and distinguishing the shades of meaning between
'unlawful killing . . . with malice aforethought' and 'unlawful, willful, deliberate,
malicious and premeditated killing."'
The length of time required for premeditation and deliberation is not even ap-
proximately settled by law. The approach of this test is complicated by the fact that a
time element is implied in the relation of "intent" (which is a distinctive feature of
murder as against manslaughter) to the criminal act. The embarrassment is solved by
requiring a "second thought" as a test of premeditation and deliberation. "An ap-
preciable length of time" is said to be necessary to form premeditation. Jones v. United
States, 175 F.2d 544, 552 (9th Cir. 1949). Two minutes were held insufficient
in Hiatt v. Brown, 175 F.2d 273 (5th Cir. 1949). The instructions approved by the
Supreme Court of the United States in Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463, 469
n.3 (1946), stated that under certain circumstances the period of deliberation "may
cover but a brief span of minutes."
For criticism of the premeditation and deliberation test see Keedy, supra' note 7.
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tation and deliberation test, but the test would not suffice to convict a
mercy killer of the gravest type of homicide under the modem codes.
In modern continental European codes, motive is relevant both as
an aggravating or mitigating factor in the traditional sense and as an
express or implied constitutive part of the definition of certain concepts
of crime or of criminal. As part of the definition of crime, motive a
priori determines the classification of the offense in accordance with its
graveness. For instance,48 murder, the type of homicide punishable
most severely,49 is distinguishable from other types of homicide by its
highly reprehensible motive or by a particularly reprehensible manner
of performance, which also points to basically unethical tendencies of the
actor; the actor is a "murderer." In the absence of these features, one
who commits intentional homicide is merely a "manslayer," punishable
more leniently.5" If the motive is the altruistic desire to comply with
the victim's request to be killed, the homicide turns into the separate
crime of "homicide upon request," punishable by imprisonment in terms
of only a few years.51 All these factors, singly or in combination, af-
ford the mercy killer a more lenient treatment under statutory law,
without it being necessary to resort, as is being done in our law, to
various devious maneuvers to achieve that result. Moreover, since
special treatment is warranted by statute, there is a greater assurance
of uniformity in the adjudication of euthanasia cases.
The operation of the new provisions may be best exemplified by
showing how the revised German and Swiss law affect the treatment
of mercy killing.
48. This example follows the scheme of the German Penal Code. This code
has been recently revised to a large extent, particularly by the so-called "Third
Statute Amending the Penal Law" of Aug. 4, 1953 (B.G. Bl. pt. I, at 735). The
entire Code was republished, as amended, Sept. 1, 1953 (B.G. Bl. pt. I, at 1083).
The revision, so far as the law of homicide is concerned, was necessitated by en-
actment of Art. 102 of the Constitution of the Bonn Republic of May 23, 1949
(B.G. B1. at 1), which abolished capital punishment. Formerly, the maximum
penalty for murder was death, the maximum penalty for manslaughter life con-
finement in a penitentiary (see former §§211, 212, as amended, Sept. 4, 1941, R.G.
Bl. pt. I, at 549). Since the maximum penalty for murder is now life confinement
in a penitentiary, that for manslaughter has been reduced to "confinement in a peni-
tentiary for not less than five years," life confinement being limited to "particularly
grave cases." For text of the provisions see notes 49, 50 infra. For discussion
of the significance of the change in penalties see text at notes 144, 145 infra.
49. GURMAN PENAL CODE §211 defines the concept of "murderer" as follows:
"(1) The murderer shall be punished by confinement in a penitentiary for life.
"(2) A person is a murderer if he kills a human being out of lust for killing
(Mordlst); for the satisfaction of sexual desire; out of greed (Habgier), or any
other base motives; in a treacherous or cruel manner or by means causing common
danger; or in order to make possible or to conceal another crime."
50. The term "manslayer" (GERMAN PENAL CODE § 212) is now defined:
"(1) Whoever, without being a murderer, intentionally kills a human being shall
be punished, as a manslayer, by confinement in a penitentiary for not less than
five years.
"(2) In particularly grave cases, confinement in a penitentiary for life shall be
imposed."
51. See discussion of "Homicide upon Request" in text following note 113 infra.
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In neither law will a mercy killer be punished as a "murderer"
(Germany) or for "murder" (Switzerland). In Germany, the pre-
meditation and deliberation test has been entirely abandoned. Under
the most recent amendment of the Penal Code, 2 a "murderer" is an in-
dividual who commits a particularly grave act of intentional homicide.
The concept of murderer, as defined by statute, comprises typical forms
of aggravated guilt. The murderer is distinguished from the "man-
slayer" either by base motive or by a manner of performance which dis-
closes depravity of mind."a While typical base motives are specified, it
52. See note 48 supra.
53. There has been a total change of emphasis in the recent amendment of the
Code. The "law of homicide" is now conceived as a unit. The distinction between
murder and manslaughter is no longer deemed an absolute one. In aggravated cases,
manslaughter may be punishable as severely as murder (compare GERMAN PENAL
CODE §§ 211, 212 supra notes 49, 50). For integration of "homicide upon request"
into the general scope of the law of homicide see text following note 138 infra.
For discussion of the change see Lange, Dar Dritte Strafrechtsaend-erungsgesetz
(Strafbereinigungsgesetz), [1953] N.J.W. 1161-65. Howevei-, the fact that the
grounds of aggravation of guilt are enumerated would still seem to be significant.
The importance of the enumeration has been repeatedly emphasized by the
Bundesgerichtshof.
Thus, in a decision rendered Nov. 25, 1952, 3 B.G.H. St. 330, the court stressed
the independence of certain statutory tests of murder. The accused, a farmer's son,
killed his illegitimate infant child by the use of poison, after having sent away the
mother under a false pretense. He committed the act in order to eliminate a source
of grief of his ailing mother and in order to preserve his family farm, which he
was in danger of losing due to the disturbance in family relations caused by the
child's birth. The court below held that, while the act was "objectively treacherous,"
the actor's "personality, his attitude toward the act, toward the child's mother and
toward the child, as well as the motive which dominated him, namely, regard for the
parental farm and for the ailing mother, do not justify the assumption of a
particularly reprehensible attitude toward the act." The Bundesgerichtshof reversed
the decision below, stating:
"The types of performance, 'treacherous' and 'cruel,' characterize particularly
reprehensible manners of performance of intentional homicide; in section 211 they
are, in principle, independent of the particularly reprehensible 'base' motives of the
actor (greed, lust for killing, satisfaction of sexual desire). True, it would be
erroneous to assume that the type of the actor's motive can never bear on the
description of killing as 'treacherous.' For, in addition to the external facts which
determine the evaluation as murder or as manslaughter, the court must also, to a
larger or smaller extent, consider the personality of the actor in context with his
mental and emotional capacity, his expectations and desires. But this does not
apply in an equal degree to all characteristics of murder, as is evident from their
diversity. Thus, in those cases where murder is characterized by maners of per-
forinance, which the statute regards as particularly reprehensible and therefore
classifies as characteristic of murder, consideration of the personality of the actor is
greatly reduced; in general, such consideration is limited to the question whether
the actor knew and desired the external characteristics of the act. On the other
hand, in evaluating the characteristics of murder based on motive, consideration of the
personality of the actor is-in accordance with the decisiveness of motive--of utmost
importance. . . . Under rare circumstances, certain motives which ethically de-
serve consideration may remove the treacherous character from a killing performed
in exploitation of the confidence of the victim and of his inability to defend him-
self. . . ."
The court held that the accused had committed the act in a treacherous manner and
was therefore guilty of murder.
In a decision rendered Sept. 23, 1952, 3 B.G.H. St. 264, the court upheld the
conviction of murder where a father killed his daughter, who suffered from epilepsy,
in order to speed her death and rid himself of a burden, the act having been com-
EUTHANASIA
is provided that "any other base motives" might bring the actor within
the definition of murderer. Where the manner of performance is the
decisive factor, judicial consideration of the total personality of the actor
is limited, but nevertheless exceptional motive is not entirely disre-
gardedV4 Clearly, mercy does not fall within any of the types of motive
which characterize the actor as a murderer. Nor is a mercy killer
likely to perform the act. in any of the enumerated manners which are
characteristic of murder. The mercy killing of a suffering, dying
patient under the pretext of applying a pain-relieving measure was ju-
dicially said not to be "treacherous" within the meaning of the law.55
The Swiss Penal Code of 1937 follows a different legislative tech-
nique. It does not enumerate either typical motives of "murder" or
typical manners of its performance.5" The true mark of murder is the
depraved mind (base attitude or mentality) or the dangerousness of
the actor. The judge has thus a broader discretion in evaluating the
actor's total personality. The term "premeditation" appears in the
definition of murder, but premeditation, in itself, is no longer either a
sufficient or an exclusive test of murder."7 As stated by the Federal
mitted by exposing the girl to hunger and cold as well as by beating. The court
held that the act fell within the statutory classification "in a cruel manner." It
stated:
"The attitude which characterizes the act as cruel need not be one which
flows from the general character of the actor and which continuously motivates his
conduct. It is sufficient that it dominated him during the act and that he, therefore,
performed the acts which externally appear cruel, knowing that they caused the
victim to suffer excessive physical and mental pain."
As may be seen from these examples, motive, while extremely significant, is
not an exclusive characteristic distinguishing murder from manslaughter. But even
where, under the statute, other features are decisive, the presence of an altruistic
motive may bear on the evaluation of these features. The same does not apply
where there is merely an absence of reprehensible motive.
54. In the court's view, as appears from the cited cases, even where the manner
of performance is the decisive factor, consideration of motive is not entirely eliminated
and such consideration may be necessary particularly where the motive is of an
exceptional nature. This is especially in point where the motive of homicide is
mercy and the performance externally appears to be "treacherous." Note that in
the last cited case (see note 53 supra), where the court stressed the "manner of
performance" most strongly, the cruelty of performance was clearly related to the
vile motive underlying the act.
55. See judgment of the Muenster court, note 25 mtpra, at 327, reversed on
other grounds. Compare also the opinion of the Bundesgerichtshof (3 B.G.H. St.
330, note 53 supra), last sentence of the quoted passage.
56. The Draft of 1918 contained an enumeration of types of motive and manners
of performance, characterizing a particularly grave felony (Art. 99). This method
was abandoned. See Abrecht v. Staatsanwalt des Berner Seelandes, 70 B.G.E. pt.
IV, at 5 (1944), 92 Journal des Tribunaux pt. IV, at 73 (1944).
57. The Swiss Penal Code of 1937 defines "manslaughter" and "murder" in
articles 111 and 112. These articles read as follows:
"Article 111. Whoever intentionally kills a human being shall, in the absence
of circumstances set forth in the following article, be punished by confinement in a
penitentiary for not less than five years."
"Article 112. Where the actor (killer) killed under circumstances or with a
premeditation, which show that he possesses a particularly reprehensible attitude
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Tribunal,58 the actor's premeditation is not taken into consideration
except to the extent that it expresses a "particularly perverse mentality
or dangerousness of the actor." On the other hand, premeditation "is
not a necessary element of murder, for the danger which the actor
represents and his depraved mind may also appear from other circum-
stances." " The mental attitude of the actor, his dangerousness or
harmlessness may be inferred from his motive. "An actor is danger-
ous where, in the light of the circumstances, it may be assumed that he
will act similarly in other situations. This is in contrast to cases in
which the intent is based on exceptional circumstances, so that the actor
is not dangerous to other men." " A typical example of the latter
type of actor is the mercy killer.
In addition to being classified as a "manslayer" rather than as a
"murderer," the mercy killer may further benefit from general provi-
sions for reduction of penalty in the case of mitigating circumstances.
The German Penal Code provides that a considerable reduction of pen-
alty (to as low as six months' imprisonment) may be granted where
the homicide was committed in the heat of passion upon provocation or
where there are "other extenuating circumstances." 61
(depraved mind) or that he is dangerous, he shall be punished by confinement in a
penitentiary for life."
58. See Abrecht v. Staatsanwalt des Berner Seelandes, supra note 56. The
Federal Tribunal functioned in all cases cited in this Article as the court of last
resort in matters arising under federal criminal law.
59. See Abrecht v. Staatsanwalt des Berner Seelandes, supra note 56.
60. GERMANN, DAS VERBRECHEN im NEuEN ST gRAxCHT comment to art. 112
of the Swiss Penal Code, at 225 (1942). Circumstances and deliberations which dis-
close a particularly reprehensible attitude of the actor were found to be present
where a woman gave her husband poison several times at intervals, in order to be
able to marry a lover. Staatsanwaltschaft des Kantons Zuerich v. Eggmann, decision
rendered March 9, 1951, 77 B.G.E. pt. IV, at 57. The court said:
"Appellant attempted to kill under circumstances and with premeditation which
disclose her particularly reprehensible attitude. The motive was particularly repre-
hensible: appellant wished to kill her husband in order to be able to marry her
lover with whom she entertained an adulterous relation. In addition, this insincere,
domineering and cold psychopath carried out her plan with unusual premeditation
and persistence. The serious effects of the first attempt at murder did not deter
her from repeating the act. No sooner did Hans Eggmann recover after a long
illness-during which the appellant cloaked her crime by devoted care of the victim-
she repeated the attempt with more effective means. The use of poison also points
to treachery." Id. at 63-64.
On the other hand, in Bayard v. Kantonsgericht Wallis, decided Sept. 23, 1952,
78 B.G.E. pt. IV, at 145, a woman who twice gave her husband food with poisonous
substance was held guilty of attempted manslaughter rather than of attempted murder.
As may be seen, the court's discretion in murder convictions is greater under Swiss
than under German law.
61. GEM=AN PENAL CODE § 213 provides:
"Where the manslayer was aroused to anger by ill treatment or by a grave
insult inflicted upon him or upon one of his relatives-without his fault-by the
deceased and was thereby instantly moved to commit the act, or where there are
other extenuating circumstances, the punishment shall be imprisonment for not less
than six months."
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The Swiss Penal Code first includes a general provision that the
judge is to consider motive when meting out punishment,62 and then
enumerates among the mitigating circumstances the so-called "honor-
able motives." ' This description indicates a sympathetic attitude of
the Code toward these motives. Germann, a noted commentator of the
Code, suggests that there might be cases in which motive, such as com-
passion, is of such decisive importance as to warrant total exculpation.64
As a rule, however, honorable motives have an extenuating effect only,
and in cases which deserve exceptional treatment recourse may be had
to the pardoning power.'
The common feature of the German and Swiss provisions, so far
as euthanasia is concerned, is the fact that neither the mercy motive
nor the patient's condition which might give rise to such motive is
specifically mentioned. By contrast, there is a group of statutes in
which these factors constitute an express element of the definition of
a special type of crime or of a special instance of guilt exclusion. The
Prussian Landrecht of 1794 66 imposed upon the "killing with intention
62. Article 63 of the Swiss PENAL CODE provides:
"The judge shall mete out punishment in accordance with the guilt of the actor;
he shall consider the motives, the prior life and the personal circumstances of the
guilty person."
63. Article 64 provides:
"The judge may mitigate the punishment . . .where the actor was induced
to commit the act (acted) by honorable motives ..
64. GmzmANN, op. cit. stpra note 60, at 56.
65. A favorable consideration of euthanasia may also result from recognition
of error of law concerning the illegality of euthanasia as a defense. Error of law
is governed in Switzerland by article 20 of the Penal Code, in Germany by de-
cisional law. In both countries, such error may lead to total exculpation or to
reduction of penalty. In Switzerland, the Federal Penal Code of 1937 made the
requirements of considering error of law as relevant more stringent than they were
under prior law. See Staatsanvaltschaft des Kantons Zug v. Husistein, 75 B.G.E.
pt. IV, at 26 (1949). Under the present rule, error of law, where based on "adequate
grounds," may, in the judge's discretion, result in a reduction of penalty or in total
exculpation. Thus, faultless error of law does not automatically entitle to acquittal.
Eidgenoessisches Volkswirtschaftsdepartement v. Schluep, 75 B.G.E. pt. IV, at 37;
Gesundheitsbehoerde Meilen v. Ellenberger, 75 B.G.E. pt. IV, at 76, 82. Under
German law, a person is required to search (exert or strain) his conscience in order
to establish what the applicable law is. See note 30 supra. This means "that,
when decision concerning the legality or illegality of a certain conduct is at stake,
the actor is required to apply all his mental powers and all his ethical value judg-
ments." See decision of Bundgesgerichtshof, Dec. 23, 1952, 4 B.G.H. St. 1. Where,
in spite of such exertion, the error occurs, it is considered as "insuperable," and
leads to total exculpation. Where, on the other hand, the error was brought about
by the actor's failure to exert his conscience, meaning that it was not "insuperable,"
the court may, in its discretion, reduce the penalty. As shown above, the
Bundesgerichtshof remanded a would-be "euthanasia" case for a finding whether the
actor was aware of the illegality of his action. See note 29 supra. Neither in
Switzerland nor in Germany will belief that an act known or felt to violate a legal
prohibition nevertheless fulfils the demands of a higher moral law be held to con-
stitute a relevant "legal error." But belief that such prohibition, being in flagrant
conflict with the dictates of a higher law, violates the fundamental principles of
the law of the land and is therefore invalid would constitute relevant error in
Germany. 4 B.G.H. St. 1.
66. Allgemeines Landrecht fuer die Preussischen Staaten of Feb. 5, 1794, pt.
II, tit. 20, § 833.
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believed to be good" of a deadly wounded or otherwise dying person a
punishment similar to that imposed upon negligent killing. The penal
codes of Wuerttemberg of 1839,6" of Thuringia of 1850,68 and of other
German states reduced the penalty for homicide below that prescribed
for "homicide upon request" where the request was made by a fatally ill
person. While these statutes are no longer in force, the Norwegian
Penal Code of 1902 contains a special provision dealing with mercy
killing, which is still in effect.6" This Code treats the mercy motivated
killing of a hopelessly ill person like killing upon request. The measure
of punishment in such homicide cases is not stated. Rather, the judge
is given discretion to reduce the punishment below the minimum which
would be otherwise applicable and to impose a milder form of penalty
than the usual one. Where mercy motive and request are combined,
the judge may take account of both and reduce the punishment below
the measure he would apply if only one of the stated factors were
present.70
A special rule on euthanasia also appeared in the Russian Penal
Code of March 22, 1903. 7' This rule, later enacted in the Baltic coun-
tries,72 was adopted by the Polish Penal Code of 1932 ,7 and, in a modi-
67. Strafgesetzbuch of March 1, 1839, tit. 2, c. 1, art. 239.
68. Das Strafgesetzbuch der Thilringischen Staaten of March 20, 1850, art. 120.
69. NORWEGIAN PENAL CODE §235 provides:
"Punishment according to sections 228 and 229 (bodily injury and rendering
a person unconscious) shall not be applied where the action was committed with
consent of the victim. Where a person was killed or suffered considerable damage
to his body or health with his own consent, or where an actor motivated by mercy
takes the life of a hopelessly ill person, or assists in such act of killing, the punish-
ment may be reduced below the minimum fixed by statute and a milder form of
penalty may be imposed.
70. The legislative reasons of this provision were summarized as follows by the
Royal Commission which prepared the draft of the Code (See ENVUuR" EINES
ALLGEMEINEN BUERGESuICHEN STRAFGESE=rZBUCHES FuER DAS KOENIGREICII
NORWEGEN. MorrvE, pt. 2, at 175 (Comm'n appointed by Royal Ordinance of Nov.
14, 1885, ed., transl. into German by Weber, 1912):
"The present draft advances further than the foreign laws and drafts, in that
it assimilates killing motivated by mercy to killing upon request. This must be
considered as perfectly justifiable in the case of hopelessly ill persons who are perhaps
unable to express a request. On the other hand, there is no need for a specific
reduction of punishment."
Compare also KLENNER, DIE TOETUNG AUF VERLANGEN Im DEUTSCHEN UND
AUSLAENDISCHEN STRAFRECHT SO wiE DE LEGE FERENDA 65 et seq. (1925), dealing at
length with the Norwegian legislation on the subject.
71. Section 460 of that Code provided as follows:
"A person guilty of homicide performed at the (urgent) request of the person
killed and out of compassion for him shall be punished by confinement in a fortress
[custodia honesta] for a term not exceeding three years."
"Attempt is punishable."
72. That part of the Code which dealt with homicide was never in force in
Russia, but during the First World War the Code was enacted in the Baltic countries.
73. POLISH PENAL CODE art. 227 (1932) provides:
'Whoever kills a human being at his request and under the influence of com-
passion for him shall be punished by imprisonment up to five years or by detention."
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fled form, in the Penal Code of Uruguay of 1933." It provides for a
reduced penalty (or, in the case of Uruguay, for total exculpation)
where a homicide is motivated by compassion and performed upon the
victim's own request. The grounds of compassion are not stated.Y5
EUTHANASIA AND THE LAW OF SUICIDE
Mercy killing upon the patient's request is often hardly distinguish-
able from assistance in suicide. Indeed, at times, the distinction ap-
pears to consist in but a legal technicality. For this reason, the de-
mand has been raised in legal literature-even in that adhering to con-
ventional theories of criminal law-for assimilation of the law on eutha-
nasia to the law on assistance in suicide." This demand is strength-
ened as criminal legislation turns from the idea of punishment based on
the effect of certain actions to the notion of punishment based on
psychological guilt. Clearly, the guilt of the physician who injects
poison into a patient's body hardly appears to be greater than that of
his colleague who hands the injection needle to the patient and in-
structs him how to use it. It has, therefore, become common practice
to discuss euthanasia in conjunction with the law on assistance in
suicide.
A preliminary question arising in connection with the law on as-
sistance in suicide is that of the relationship of assistance to the act of
suicide itself. Conventional criminal law assumes that assistance in
suicide is necessarily related in ethical judgment to the act of the prin-
cipal in the suicide. Frequently, this assumption influences legal
evaluation even after the view has been accepted in other parts of juris-
prudence that the act of each participant in crime should be judged in
accordance with his own guilt and without regard to the guilt of any
other person or to any effect brought about by the latter. It thus be-
comes necessary to discuss the law of suicide itself.
The "right" to commit suicide is one of the most controversial sub-
jects in the history of mankind,"' and until the present time the laws
74. PExAL CoDE OF URUGUAY art. 37 (Law No. 9155), promulgated Dec. 4,
1933, effective as of July 1, 1934, provides:
"The judges are authorized to forego punishment of a person whose previous
life has been honorable where he commits a homicide motivated by compassion, in-
duced by repeated requests of the victim."
The provision is interpreted as conferring a power of judicial pardon. See BOUZA,
EL HomircIo FOR PIMDAD Y EL NuEvo C6DiGo PENxL (1935).
75. Judicially it has been pointed out, however, that compassion exists only
where the actor is convinced that the person demanding death is suffering and that
death to him is rather a relief. See Polish decision of Feb. 24, 1936 (orz. 24 i
1936, zb. nr. 336/36), cited in MAKAxa\Vicz, KODEKS KARNY z KOmmLNTARZEm
art. 227, comment (5th ed. 1938).
76. See notes 117, 118 infra.
77. In Bayet's words (LE SuIcm- ET LA MORALE, Introduction, 5 et seq.
(1922)): "After twenty centuries of discussion, the question has remained open and
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on suicide vary widely in the legal systems of the world. In continental
Europe, France was first in legalizing suicide.7" Upon motion of the
famous Docteur Guillotin, the National Assembly, on January 21, 1790,
repealed all sanctions against the body and the property of the suicide,7"
and subsequent legislation did not reenact the provisions prohibiting
suicide. This means, under the rule of the principle "Nullum crimen
sine lege," that suicide is not a crime in France. Several German codes
followed suit, and today immunity of suicide is a generally accepted
principle of continental European law.
By contrast, the English law preserved the common law concep-
tion of suicide as a felony. At common law, the punishment for him
who committed it was interment in the highway with a stake driven
through the body, and the forfeiture of his lands, goods, and chattels
to the king. While sanctions against the body and property of the sui-
cide have been removed, the attempt by a person deliberately to end
his own life is still an attempt to commit a felony, though not an "at-
tempt to commit murder" within the Offences against the Person Act
of 1861.80
In the United States, the English common law on suicide was
never accepted with all its implications. As stated in Burnett v. Peo-
ple,81 "as we have never had a forfeiture of goods, or seen fit to define
what character of burial our citizens shall enjoy, we have never re-
garded the English law as to suicide as applicable to the spirit of our
institutions." Yet in New York, for instance, while suicide is declared,
by statute, not to be a crime, censure of the act as "a grave public
posed in the same terms as ever." Neither the Old nor the New Testament ex-
pressly dealt with the subject of suicide. However, the Canon Law condemned it as
criminal homicide. Canon 12, caus. 23, quest. 4. It has been pointed out (LEss,
VOM SELBSTMORDE (1776)) that all those who are mentioned in the Bible as having
committed suicide were evildoers: Samson, Saul, Ahitophel. On the other hand,
it has been noticed that Pelagia, who committed suicide, was glorified as a Saint,
and that Thomas Moore, who advocated euthanasia, was beatified and later canonized.
Perhaps the most noteworthy apologies of suicide are those of Seneca (Es'. 70),
Hume (ON THE SUICIDE), Montesquieu (LEanms PERSANES, Lettre 76, at 189
(1901 ed.)), and Shopenhauer (PARERGA UNID PARALIPOMENA C. 13).
78. Montesquieu, op. cit. supra note 77, was first in demanding secularization of
the suicide problem and a law reform granting immunity to suicides. Among the
critics of the position of the Church on suicide were Diderot (Suicide, DICTIONNAIRE
ENCYCLOPEDIQUE) and Voltaire (Du Suicide, MELANGES DE LitATuRax, D'HIsTOIRE
ET DE PHIL0SOHIE; Du Suicide, POLITIQUE, LEGISLATION), although they did not
approve of suicide. These writers of the Era of the Enlightenment influenced French
revoluntionary leaders, particularly Marat. See MARAT, PLAN DE LEGISLATION
CRimINELLE § 3 (Du Suicide).
79. For a comprehensive report on the development which led to this legislation
and on the general history of ideas on suicide see Szittya, SEIBSTmoEDER EIN
BEITRAG ZUR KULTURGESCHICHTE ALLER ZEITEN UND VOELKER (1925).
80. 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100. See Rex v. Mann, 110 L.T. 781 (1914). The act is
punishable like any other attempt to commit crime, vz5., fine or imprisonment up to
two years.
81. 204 Ill. 208, 68 N.E. 505, 510 (1903).
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wrong" is inserted into the very language of the statute 2 Judicially,
on the other hand, it has been held that suicide is not a "crime involving
moral turpitude." 11
In modem times, therefore, immunity of suicide actually means
immunity of attempted suicide. But the law with respect to the insti-
gator, aider and abettor of suicide varies in the different statutory sys-
tems. There are, broadly speaking, three groups of statutes dealing
with such persons. In jurisdictions where the distinction between ac-
cessory and principal is abolished, they are treated as principals in homi-
cide. 4 Where punishment of accessories is predicated upon the criminal
character of the act of the principal, the instigator, aider and abettor of
suicide enjoy immunity, the act of the principal not being a crime.
Finally, certain statutes specifically define instigating, aiding and
abetting suicide as independent crimes sui generis. Each of these rules
concerning the instigating, aiding and abetting of suicide has an ethical
bearing on the problem of euthanasia.
Perhaps the most objectionable feature of the first mentioned rule,
under which the aider or abettor of suicide is treated as a principal in
homicide, is the fact that no distinction is drawn between cases in
which the suicide is an involuntary agent unaware of the consequences
of his deed-a child or a lunatic-and cases in which he is a free and
responsible adult.8 5 Obviously, such disregard of the profound ethical
difference that exists between the two types of acts is not within the
spirit of our institutions. However, as long as this rule prevails, it
would certainly be inconsistent to apply a less stringent standard to
mercy killing. A reform of criminal legislation in jurisdictions which
adhere to this rule would require reexamination of fundamental con-
ceptions of crime, including accompliceship in suicide and mercy killing.
The second rule, though somewhat antiquated, deserves special
notice because the manner in which it is administered abroad vividly
demonstrates the injustice of a differential treatment of mercy killing
and aiding a suicide. Immunity of instigating, aiding and abetting
82. NEW YORK PENAL LAW § 2301 (1944) contains this peculiar legislative
attempt at censuring suicide without imposing any legal sanction upon it:
"Although suicide is deemed a grave public wrong, yet from the impossibility
of reaching the successful perpetrator, no forfeiture is imposed."
However, neither is a penalty imposed on the unsuccessful perpetrator. Attempt is
not punishable.
83. Hundert v. Commercial Travellers' Mut. Acc. Ass'n, 244 App. Div. 459,
279 N.Y. Supp. 555 (lst Dep't 1935).
84. McMahan v. State, 168 Ala. 70, 53 So. 89 (1910); People v. Roberts, 211
Mich. 187, 178 N.W. 690 (1920).
85. This was expressly stated to be the law in Burnett v. State, 204 Ill. 208, 222-
23, 68 N.E. 505, 511 (1903).
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.suicide, in the dogmatic view prevailing in France " and in Germany,
follows from the definition of the term "accessory" or "accomplice."
In Germany, the accessory (instigator or aider) is defined as one who
"induces another to commit an act" or "gives assistance . . . in the
commission of an act . . . for which punishment is prescribed." 87
Since suicide is not such an act, neither is an accessory to it subject to
punishment." This position has been severely criticized both in
France 9 and in Germany,90 and in both countries recourse is taken in
extreme cases to the theory of "indirect causation." 9'
Immunity of the accessory to suicide on the ground that suicide
itself is not a crime defined by statute is particularly striking in Ger-
many, where, in all other respects, there is a tendency to judge the act
of each individual independently, in accordance with his own guilt."
Where the accessory is punishable although the principal enjoys a per-
sonal immunity, 3 it would seem inconsistent that the accessory to
suicide should escape punishment on the ground that suicide itself is
not a crime. In fact, this inconsistency has caused much judicial dis-
comfort and, since in some cases "indirect causation" is clearly inap-
plicable, the Bundesgerichtshof recently developed a new doctrine bring-
ing participation in suicide within the orbit of criminal law. It held
the intentional or negligent failure of an accused, having a duty to act,
86. This position is accepted both in commentaries and in decisional law, in the
latter since Appeal of Catherine Lhuillier, Cour de cassation, April 27, 1815, [1816]
Sirey, pt. I. 317.
87. GERMAN PENAL CODE §§ 48, 49. The text of these sections was basically
amended by a Law of May 29, 1943, [1943] Reichgesetzblatt, pt. 1, at 341, 342. Since
that amendment, the accessory is punishable if the act of the principal is "an act for
which punishment is prescribed." It need not be a "punishable act," as was the case
in prior legislation, so that the accessory may now be punished although the prin-
cipal enjoys a personal immunity. Thus, an accessory may be punishable although the
principal is acquitted on the ground that he acted under a mistake of fact. B.G.H.,
Urt. v. 22 Oct. 1953, 4 St. R. 112/53, [1954] NJ.W. 119.
88. For a similar view, see United States v. Selph, 82 F. Supp. 56, 58 (S.D.
Cal. 1949).
89. See BADR, 'INFLUENCE DU CONSENTEMENT DE LA VicTiE sUR LA RE-
SPoNsABILITA PLNALE, "-TUDE ComPARfE 108 et seq. (1928), and authorities cited at
110 et seq.
90. See literature cited in KLENNER, op. cit. supra note 70, at 54 et seq.
91. KoHiLER, STUDiEN 145 (1890), assumes in all cases of instigation of suicide
an intellectual causation which renders the instigator punishable on the ground that
"he killed the actor by the medium of the latter's own person." The prevailing
doctrine assumes indirect causation in all cases in which the actor is legally incapable
to form a valid will.
92. Of several persons participating in a crime, each is punishable in accordance
with his own guilt, without regard to the guilt of another. GERMAN PENAL CODE
§ 50(1). Where particular qualities or circumstances aggravate, mitigate or exclude
guilt, they will result in disadvantage or in benefit only to that individual to whom
they apply. Id. § 50(2). Compare also § 56 (see note 40 supra).
93. Compare note 87 supra
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to save the life of a suicide, when the latter was no longer in a position
to save himself, to be direct culpable homicide, for which the accused
was responsible as a principal. 4
Since the accessory to suicide enjoys immunity whereas a person
killing another, however motivated, is subject to severe punishment,
drawing a workable distinction between assistance in suicide and direct
performance becomes a matter of vital concern. Efforts in this direc-
tion, however, so far have been unsuccessful.
The distinction between the notion of "principal" and that of "ac-
cessory" is predicated upon choice between two familiar opposing legal
94. Decision of Bundesgerichtshof, Feb. 12, 1952, 2 B.G.H. St. 150. After a
quarrel with his wife, the deceased hanged himself. The wife saw him hanging
but did not cut him off, although she could have easily done so. She was, as the
court below found, "satisfied with the course of events--events which had occurred
without any action on her part." She was convicted of the crime of "Failure to
Render Assistance" (GERMNAX PENAL CODE §330(c)), and appealed. The prosecu-
tion, also appealing, asked for conviction of manslaughter. The Bundesgerichtshof
reversed and remanded. It held that the crime of "failing to assist" did not apply,
since, by statutory definition, assistance under § 330(c) is required only in the case
of an "accident," and suicide is not an "accident" It held, however, that §212
(manslaughter) or §222 (negligent homicide) may be applicable. It said:
"Several persons may cause the same criminal consequence-here, the death of a
human being-in different ways, by prohibited action as well as by omission contrary
to duty; and, depending on their mental attitude toward the act and the consequence
of the act (direction of will, dominance over the act, interest in the consequence
of the act, scope of own action), they may be co-principals, instigators or ac-
complices. These principles apply to every culpable causation of the consequence:
also to 'participation' in suicide and its causation. Therefore, the immunity of suicide
under German law does not exclude criminal responsibility of other persons; it is
limited to certain cases only." 2 B.G.H. St. at 151.
The court went on to say that neither instigation nor indirect causation was
present in the case, both types of action requiring the exercise of influence upon the
will of the suicide. Assistance in suicide not being a crime under German law, there
remained to be considered the crime of direct participation in the act. Such crime-
the court said-may have occurred. Since the accused could have prevented the
death of her husband, her failure to prevent it contributed to such death. "In
omitting to act, contrary to duty, she failed to interrupt the chain of causation started
by her husband; she thereby participated in causing his death. . . ." The duty of
the accused to assist her husband was based, in the opinion of the court, on the
nature of the matrimonial community under German law. Responsibility as a
principal (manslaughter or negligent homicide) for failure to act in accordance
with her duty depends on her attitude toward the consequence. If she desired or
consciously accepted that consequence, she was guilty of manslaughter.
The court's ruling concerning the crime of "failing to render assistance" has been
recently reversed. The Great Senate for Criminal Matters of the Bundesgerichtshof
held (B.G.H., Beschl. d. Gr. Str. Sen. v. 10 March 1954, G.S. St. 4/53, [1954]
N.J.W. 1049-50) that suicide is an "accident" within the meaning of § 330(e) of the
German Penal Code.
"Failure to render assistance" is also a crime under the FRENCH PENAL CODE
art. 63, 12. For a recent decision convicting a physician for failure to respond
to a call for medical assistance, see decision of the Court of Appeal of Bordeaux
of Oct. 28, 1953, reported in [1954] Recueil Dalloz 13. The provision also applies
to failure to assist a suicide. See Homicide, 2 ENcYcLoPtDIE, DRoT CRIMINEL
item 46 (Dalloz 1954). However, the courts interpret the provision rather narrowly.
See Trib. corr. Lesparre, Jan. 25, 1945, Juris-Classeurs, [1945] SEMAINE JUMDiQUE
II. 2896, with note, R.B., and C. de Rouen, Ch. corr., March 31, 1949, in [1950]
REcUEIL Dalloz 9 (Sommaires).
1954]
374 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 103
theories, the subjective and the objective theoryY According to the
former, the difference between a principal and an accomplice lies solely
in the different will-direction of such persons, not in who performs the
act. The principal has the "dominant" will or "animus auctoris," the
accomplice has the "subordinate" will or "animus socii"; the former
desires the action as his own, the latter as that of another person. Ac-
cording to the objective theory, the principal physically performs the
action which the law defines as a crime; the accomplice prepares or pro-
motes it. When applied to the problem at issue in this paper, either
answer seems unsatisfactory.
In Germany the Reichsgericht adopted the subjective theory,
whereby a physician who completely subjects his will to that of the
patient and hence does not intend to perform the killing as "his own ac-
tion," is only an accomplice in suicide, even if, from an objective point
of view, he performs the decisive action, e.g., injects the poison while
the patient extends his arm. 6 In criticizing this position, Frank
pointed out that in all cases of euthanasia upon request of the patient
the actor subordinates his will to that of the deceased and thus would
seem to be an accomplice in suicide.97 The objectivists, on the other
hand, draw the demarcation line in accordance with the apparent
character of the action. If the physician writes the prescription for
poison or concocts the poison or prepares the injection needle and in-
structs the patient how to use it, while the latter takes the poison, or
injects the needle, the physician is merely an accomplice in suicide. He
is a principal in homicide if he himself gives the poison or injects the
needle. Here too there are doubtful borderline cases, such as the case
in which the physician brings the glass filled with poison to the patient's
lips. Mezger 9 made the answer dependent on the question whether
the patient at all times has the power over the performance of the
killing.99 The patient has such power when the poison is brought to
his lips but not in the case of an injection. After summarizing these
arguments, Engisch exclaims:
95. On these theories, see KILNNER, op. cit. supra note 70, at 55 et seq.;
SCHOENKE, op. cit. supra note 33, at 162 et seq.; BuscH, MODERNE WANDLUNGEN
DER VERBRECHENSLEHRE 17 et seq. (1949); MAURACH, SCHULD UND VERANTWORTUNG
IM STRAFRECHT 56 et seq. (1948).
96. See particularly 70 RG. St. 315 (1936).
97. 18 FRANK, DAS STRAFGESEZBUCH FUER DAS DEUTSCHE REIcH 103 et seq.
(18th rev. ed. 1929-30).
98. MEZGER, STRAFRECHT 416, 417 (3d printing 1949).
99. This is the so-called "mixed theory." On this theory see Gallas, Note to
Decision of O.G.H.B.Z. Urt. v. 15 March 1949, St. S. 37/49, in 5 Deutsche Recht-
szeitschrift 67 (1950), and literature cited in that note. As may be seen from the
example set forth in the text, this theory offers no better solution than do the two
principal theories.
EUTHANASIA
"Now the shrewd physician knows what to do. But aren't
we lawyers ashamed of ourselves? Isn't the mental attitude of
the actor being neglected, the borderline between guilt and im-
munity made dependent on superficial factors? The Reichsgericht
with its 'subjectivism' seems to be more sensible. But, of course,
if its decisions are followed, there remains the danger of a too
far-reaching immunity. Perhaps, however, this is no danger at
all but a welcome consequence ?" "o
On the other hand, the Bundesgerichtshof recently emphasized that
a person who has a special duty with regard to the suicide cannot ar-
bitrarily transform his intent into an "intent of acting as an accessory"
(Gehilfenvorsatz) by a "mental reservation of not desiring death as
a consequence of his own action." 1o Where he desires the consequence
-the court said-it is irrelevant what meaning he psychologically
attributes to his conduct, and solely decisive "what meaning it actually
had for the course of events." In the court's view, a person under duty
to act-and a physician attending a patient undoubtedly has a duty
to assist him °2-is bound to save the suicide even after the act was
committed, under sanction of being held responsible as a principal in
homicide, provided that he desired death to occur (or was negligent
with regard to it)."' This ruling would seem to exclude the phy-
sician's immunity for assistance in a patient's suicide. However, the
court suggested a possible exception to the new rule: the duty to
act may not apply where the suicide is based on "ethically justifiable"
grounds." 4 Thus, the distinction between the various forms of par-
100. ENGISCH, op. cit. supra note 5, at 11, 12.
101. See note 94 supra.
102. Among the persons bound to assist, the court enumerated police officers,
firemen, swimming instructors, teachers, heads of educational institutions, directors
of boarding schools, prison wardens, medical attendants, nurses.
103. Under German law, a person who does not directly desire the consequence
but who considers such consequence as possible and approves of it in the event it
occurs, as well as a person who does not desire the consequence but foresees that
it will occur as a result of his conduct and permits it to occur, are deemed to have
"intended" the consequence. See Decision of Bundesgerichtshof, Feb. 12, 1952, 2
B.G.H. St. 150, 156.
104. The court said:
"The husband's desire to commit suicide did not exclude the duty of the accused
to avert it. This desire brought about a danger to his life, which she was in duty
bound to oppose to the best of her ability. True, husband and wife have, essentially,
equal rights. Within the marriage community, each may expect the other to respect
his decisions which are ethically justifiable. But the facts of the case do not give
occasion to examine under what special circumstances this legal idea could have
freed the accused from her duty of care and of averting danger (from her husband).
The husband of the accused was not incurably ill and suffering great pain; nor was
he exposed to any other danger without a way out. There appear to be no facts
present which might have withdrawn his decision to commit suicide from interference
by another person in such a compelling manner, as to put an end to the duty of
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ticipation in suicide, and hence between immunity and criminal re-
sponsibility, ultimately turns on motive. Once the motive of suicide
is deemed relevant, special consideration of euthanasia seems to be
close at hand.
Finally to be considered is the third rule as to instigating, aiding
and abetting suicide. Under this rule, such acts are punished as crimes
sui generis."' It is the rule adopted in the New York Penal Code.
The crime is characterized as manslaughter in the first degree or as
just a felony, depending on whether the suicide was successful or re-
mained in the stage of an attempt.1' Foreign legislation, on the other
hand, draws distinctions on grounds bearing on the character of the
act or its motives.
The most interesting special legislative provision in this field is
that of Switzerland. Whoever instigates another to the commission
of suicide or assists him therein is punishable provided that his action
is caused by "selfish motives." 107 Intent alone is not sufficient; 108 if the
marital care and of averting danger (from the deceased) and as to exclude criminal
guilt." Ibid.
In its decision of March 10, 1954, supra note 94, the Great Senate for Criminal
Matters took notice of the possibility of justifiable suicide (in extreme cases) within
the context of the crime of "failing to render assistance." The court pointed out
that justifiable suicide is sufficiently covered by an element in the definition of
"failing to render assistance": only a person who "may be expected to act" (dem
zuzumuten war) is guilty if he fails to do so.
The court briefly brushed aside the argument that inclusion of failure to assist
a victim of suicide in § 330(e) is inconsistent with the fact that active assistance
in suicide is not a crime under German law. It said that the framers of § 330 (e)
were aware of the immunity of assistance in suicide and nevertheless chose to include
failure to save a suicide in the new section. The result is that, under present German
law (the criminal senates of the Bundesgerichtshof are bound by the decision of the
Great Senate), by the court's express admission, "assistance in suicide, coinciding with
failure to assist, is, in itself, not punishable, but leaves intact the criminality of
omitted assistance in the face of the danger created by the attempted suicide." The
same situation seems to prevail in France. See note 94 supra.
105. Accompliceship in suicide is punishable as crime sui generis in Norway,
§ 236 of the Penal Code of 1902, and Austria. In Austria punishment of suicide was
first expressly abolished by Article 16 of the Imperial Decree of January 17, 1850,
R.G. Bl. 24. This repeal gave rise to discussion concerning the legality of accomplice-
ship in suicide. The Supreme Court of Austria in several cases took the position
that accompliceship in suicide is subject to punishment under § 335 of the Penal
Code as a "minor crime against safety." The court said (see grounds of decision
of Nov. 16, 1907, No. 3395) that "suicide, though not punishable, is at any rate
ethically reprehensible." On June 19, 1934, the Code was amended (Strafrecht-
saenderungsgesetz, [1934] B.G. BI. 77), and accompliceship in suicide was made
separately punishable (§ 139b) along with homicide upon request (§ 139a).
106. NEw YORK PENAL LAW §§ 2304, 2305 (1944).
107. Swiss PENaAL CoDE art. 115 provides:
"Whoecver, from selfish motives, induces another to commit suicide or assists
him therein shall be punished, if the suicide was successful or attempted, by confine-
ment in a penitentiary for not more than five years or by imprisonment."
108. GE .AxN, op. cit. supra note 60, at 227, 228. Selfish motives are not always
identical with the desire for profit. See GERmANN, ScawEzzmuscHEs SmAFasE'rz-
BtrcH art. 115, comment (4th rev. ed. 1947).
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motives are altruistic, punishment will not lie. Thus, a physician who,
motivated by mercy, assists in a patient's suicide is not subject to
punishment. While the "euthanasia" motive receives full consideration
in the law concerning assistance in suicide, the difference between such
assistance and direct performance is, nevertheless, preserved.10 9
In evaluating euthanasia, it is important to distinguish between
acts performed in response to an unsolicited request of the patient and
acts in which the first suggestion is made by the actor. An analogy to
this distinction may be found in the difference between assistance in
suicide and instigation thereof. Conventional criminal law treats the
two types of participation alike. In certain older, no longer valid, laws
of Japan and China, however, instigation of suicide and assistance
therein were governed by distinctive rules. In the Japanese Penal Code
of April 23, 1907,110 suicide and assistance therein were not mentioned.
Hence, it may be assumed that these acts were not subject to punish-
ment. Instigation of suicide was punishable. In the Chinese Penal
Code of March 10, 1912,' instigation of suicide was punishable more
severely than assistance in the act. These provisions have been amended
109. The diversification of punishment provided for by the Italian Penal Code
also deserves special notice. Article 580 of that Code reads as follows:
"Whoever instigates another to commit suicide or reinforces his intention to do
so or in any manner promotes the execution of suicide shall be punished, where the
suicide is successful, by confinement from five to twelve years. Where the suicide
is not successful, such person shall be punished by confinement from one year to five
years, provided that the attempt at suicide results in a serious or very grave per-
sonal injury.
"The penalties shall be increased in case the person who is being instigated,
induced or assisted is in a condition such as described in numbers 1 or 2.of the pre-
ceding article (a minor of less than eighteen years, or a mentally defective person,
or a person who is in a condition of psychological deficiency caused by another in-
firmity or by abuse of alcohol or of drugs). However, if the said person is less than
fourteen years old or possesses no capacity to understand or to form a will, the pro-
vision with regard to murder shall be applied."
By contrast, the special provision of the Polish Code on contribution to suicide
is rather brief; it speaks solely of participation in a person's "attempt upon his own
life." This provision, rather significantly, points up the distinction between causation
and inducement of suicide. POLISH PENAL CODE art. 228 (1932) states:
"Whoever by instigation or by lending aid induces another to make an attempt
upon his own life shall be punished by imprisonment up to five years."
As pointed out by Makarewicz (op. cit. .upra note 75, art. 227, comment),
where the suicide is an incompetent person, the actor is responsible for indirect
causation of death rather than for instigation of suicide, for instigation presupposes
that the object possesses a free will.
110. Reported in KLENNER, op. cit. supra note 70, at 74-75.
111. CHnESE PENAL CODE §314 (March 10, 1912) provided:
"Whoever instigates another to commit suicide or kills another with the latter's
consent shall be punished by imprisonment of the fourth to the second degree.
"Whoever assists another in committting suicide or kills another at the latter's
request shall be punished by imprisonment of the fifth to the third degree."
The information on Chinese law in this Article was received from Mr. Choung
Chan of the Library of Congress.
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both in Japan ..2 and in China," 3 and the same penalty has been im-
posed on both instigation of suicide and assistance in the act.
HOmiCIDE UPON REQUEST
The immunity of accompliceship in suicide under those laws which
base such immunity on the doctrine that punishment of an accessory is
necessarily predicated upon criminality of the principal act is a legisla-
tive quirk rather than the result of a considered judgment. It is un-
doubtedly not an expression of a recognition in these laws of a "right of
suicide" or a "right to die" with a concomitant right of delegating ex-
ecution to another person. Homicide committed at the request of the
victim is hence a crime. Moreover, such homicide is a crime under
all civilized legal systems. Yet, since homicide upon request is usually
committed with premeditation so that, under conventional criminal leg-
islation, it constitutes the gravest type of homicide, it has been felt that,
in view of the rather exceptional motive underlying the act, the harsh
rule on "murder" should be modified." 4 The notion has gained ground
that killing, while always reprehensible, is less reprehensible when per-
formed with the consent of the victim than when performed against his
will. The product of such reasoning is the introduction into the law
of the separate crime of "homicide upon request," which is punishable
less severely than ordinary homicide. As pointed out in the Statement
of Legislative Policy introducing the section on "Homicide upon Re-'
quest" of the Draft of the Penal Code of the North German Federa-
tion:
"The sense of justice requires that killing a consenting per-
son . . . should not be punished as severely as killing a person
against his will. But the uncontested moral principle that life is an
inalienable value permits neither immunity nor a low penality." n1
112. Article 202 of the current Japanese Penal Code, as found in THE CONSTITU-
TION OF JAPAN AND CRiamiNAL LAWS 35 (ed. and transl. by the Attorney-General's
Office, Japanese Government 1951), reads as follows:
"Every person who has instigated or assisted another person to commit suicide
or has killed a person at such person's request or with his consent shall be punished
with penal servitude or imprisonment for not less than six months nor more than
seven years."
113. CHINESE PENAL CODE OF 1935, art. 275 provides:
"Whoever instigates another to commit suicide or assists another in the com-
mission of suicide or kills another at the latter's request or with his consent shall
be punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than seven years."
See note III mipra.
114. On the origins of the provision on "homicide upon request," see opinion
of the Bundesgerichtshof, Feb. 7, 1952, 2 B.G.H. St. 258. The court pointed out that
the provision was introduced into German law at a time when the "premeditation
and deliberation" test was in force for the purpose of affording relief against the
harshness of that test.
115. This code (Strafgesetzbuch fuer den Norddeutschen Bund of May 31, 1870)
later became the Penal Code of the Reich (Law of May 15, 1871). The passage
reproduced from the draft of the Code is quoted in KLENNER, op. cit. supra note
70, at 24.
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In Italy, reduction of penalty in the case of homicide upon request
has been justified on the ground of the "lesser intrinsic graveness of the
act and the lesser social dangerousness" of the actor."' In France,
Chauveau and H6lie advocated adoption of a special statute creating
a distinct and separate crime of "homicide upon request" on the ground
that justice requires punishment to be distributed equitably and that
crime repression is jeopardized where punishment ceases to fit the
seriousness of the crime." 7  Garcon emphasized the injustice of treat-
ing killing upon request as homicide and at the same time regarding as-
sistance in suicide as not criminal at all, when these actions are fre-
quently hardly distinguishable from each other." 8
Homicide upon request has been frequently discussed as part of the
general problem concerning the influence of the victim's consent upon
criminal responsibility." 9 Occasionally, immunity or reduction of pen-
alty for acts committed with consent or upon request of the victim has
been advocated by reference to the Roman maxim volenti non fit in-
juria.120  Injuria, of course, was a tort, not a crime. Hence, the
maxim never had any bearing on the issue of criminal responsibilty.' 2 '
In any event, the application of the maxim to homicide cases would
necessarily result in a total exculpation rather than in a reduction of
penalty.
22
While the privileged treatment of homicide upon request is not
based on the assumption of the alienability of life,'2 denial of such treat-
ment has been frequently justified, particularly in England and in this
country,124 on the ground that life is inalienable.
116. 4 SALTELLI & RomINo-Di FALco, COmmNTO TEoRico-PRATIco DEL Nuovo
CODICE PENALE comment to art. 579, at 252 (2d ed. 1940).
117. 3 CHAUVEAU & H-uE, THoR DU CoDaP-NAL No. 1245, at 478 et seq.
(6th ed. 1887/1888).
118. GAR(ON, CODE P-NAL ANNoTf 691 (1901/1906).
119. See BADR, op. cit. supra note 89, at 93 et seq.
120. This was the position taken by von Humboldt, Henke, Waechter, Ortmann,
Rodenbeck, Kessler, and Klee. For discussion and criticism of their views, see
BINDING & HOCHE, op. cit. supra note 21, at 22.
121. So far as the specific issue of homicide upon request is concerned, the
Roman source material affords no basis for assuming it to have been privileged.
The Digests would seem to suggest that man was not deemed to be an absolute
master over his own limbs: "Liber homo suo nomine utilem Aquiliae habet actionem,
directam enim non habet, quoniam dominus membrorum suorum nemo videtur."
Digest 9. 2. 13.
122. BINDING & HOcHE, op. cit. supra note 21, at 22.
123. See the rationale of "homicide upon request," as set forth in the Statement
of Legislative Policy introducing the Penal Code of the North German Federation,
supra note 115.
124. State v. Moore, 25 Iowa 128 (1868); Martin v. Commonwealth, 184 Va.
1009, 37 S.E2d 43 (1946).
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As under the Roman,' Canon I and common law, 2 7 so under
the English and American statutory penal law, consent or request of
the victim are entirely irrelevant in homicide cases. "Invitation and
consent" to the perpetration of homicide "do not constitute defenses,
adequate excuses or provocations." "I
In spite of vigorous criticism by French commentators, consent or
request is equally irrelevant in the French law of homicide. This rule
is inferred, by way of a narrow interpretation, from the wording of
the statute which defines "premeditation" as "a design formed prior to
the action . . . even though such design might be dependent on some
circumstance or on some condition." 19 Only Chauveau and H6lie
made a feeble attempt at reading a different meaning into the law of
homicide by requiring the intention to kill to be motivated by the desire
to do harm. 30 This argument-similar to that advanced by the defense
and rejected by the court in this country in Turner v. State '3--was
also rejected in France. Since 1827, when the Cour de cassation 1"2
affirmed a death sentence for a defendant who killed with the victim's
125. See note 121 supra.
126. The irrelevancy of consent follows from the fact that suicide and attempted
suicide are crimes under Canon Law. Equally criminal is any participation in the
suicide of another. The Corpus Juris Canonici states one universal rule as to all
participation in crimes: all participants who share in the execution in the manner
pointed out in Canon 2209, §§ 1-3, incur the same penalty as the principal perpe-
trators. Cf. Canon 2231.
The distinction between alienable and inalienable rights originated in the Canon
Law. According to Wharton it is this Canon Law doctrine which swept the
European continent and was finally accepted in the American Declaration of Inde-
pendence and in the Bills of Rights of the several states. 1 WHARTON, CRIMINAL.
LAw 236 (12th ed. 1932).
127. See MILLER, CRIMINAL LAW 172 and n.3 (1934).
128. Martin v. Commonwealth, 184 Va. 1009, 1018-19, 37 S.E.2d 43, 47 (1946).
129. FE RcH PENAL CODE art. 297.
130. 3 CHAUvEAU & HkLE, op. cit. supra, note 117, No. 1238, at 484-85. The
authors contend that, since no such motive exists in the case of killing upon request, the
action is not covered by the law and is hence not subject to punishment. They then
proceed to criticize the result thus reached, saying that killing upon request violates
the social order and should be punished, albeit not as severely as other forms of
homicide. For their advocacy of a separate crime of homicide upon request, see.
id., No. 1245, at 478 et seq.
131. 119 Tenn. 663, 108 S.W. 1139 (1908). The defense argued that the action
of the accused having been performed in response to a request by the deceased
(suicide pact), it lacked the necessary malice and hence was not murder. The
court rejected this argument, saying: ". . . it is not necessary that express malice,
in the sense of hatred or malevolence toward the deceased, should be shown in order
to suuport a verdict of murder in the first degree." Id. at 673, 108 S.W. at 1141. It
also said: "Murder is no less murder because the homicide is committed at the desire
of the victim. He who kills another upon his desire or command is, in the judgment
of the law, as much a murderer as if he had done it merely of his own head." Id.
at 671, 108 S.W. at 1141.
132. The highest court of France in civil and criminal matters.
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consent,"= the law is well settled that consent constitutes no defense in
homicide cases.
34
On the other hand, in other countries the separate crime 135 of
"homicide upon request" has developed into an established institution.
The distinctive feature of that crime, differentiating it from other forms
of statutory homicide, consists in the fact that the request or consent of
the victim is a material operative fact. So far as classification of an act
within that crime is concerned, it is irrelevant why the request was
made. It may have been made in the course of a joint suicide, for the
purpose of escaping dishonor, in order to put an end to a painful life,
or on some trivial ground. Clearly, where euthanasia was performed
upon request of the patient, the actor may, on the ground of such re-
quest, avail himself of the benefit of the special section. But the eutha-
nasia motive is not necessary to bring the act within the facts of "homi-
cide upon request." '3 Of course, the presence of conditions which
might lead to euthanasia may be used to show that the request was
made.
However, in legal literature there is felt to be a kinship between
euthanasia and homicide upon request. Under the Norwegian statute,
where both euthanasia motive and request are present, the reduction of
penalty may be considerable.1
7
133. Appeal of Lefloch, Cour de cassation, Nov. 16, 1827, 28 Sirey, pt. I.
135. See [1828] Dalloz jurisprudence I. 24.
134. For a detailed discussion of the problem of homicide upon request, with
special emphasis on French law, see BADR, op. cit. mpra note 89, at 123 et seq.
135. The Uruguayan legislation (see note 74 supra) represents a distinctive
type, in that, under Article 37 of the Penal Code of Uruguay, "homicide upon re-
quest" motivated by compassion (it is referred to rather as "homicidio piadoso"-
compassionate homicide) entirely excludes punishment. Article 37 is part of Chapter
3 of the Penal Code, entitled "De las Causas de Impunidad."
136. This has been particularly emphasized in the legislative history of the
Italian provision (ITAL.A PNAL CODE art. 579, infra note 138). In his report on the
final draft, the Keeper of the Seals stated ("Lavori preparatori," ecc., vol. 5, parte
2a, § 661, cited in SALTELLi & RoMANO-DI FALco, op. cit. Mpra note 116, at 253-
54 n.:
"As far as the . . . project of requiring a particular motive of compassion is
concerned, it seemed to me that the cases which deserve benevolent consideration, as
brought out by the case material, in reality transcend the category of mercy killings
which is too narrow. Where compassion and consent are combined as motives of
crime, the scheme of the draft permits the application of another extenuating factor
or of the general one provided for in number 1 of Art. 66 (62 of the Code). In
considering the latter, it may be pointed out that even a homicide not consented
to by the victim may be, in a way, punished less severely, if it has been induced by
motives of compassion, as may occur in cases of persons incapable to consent because
of an intervening death struggle. When this is established, the provision of Art.
66, no. 1, will permit the judge to reduce punishment within the framework not of
homicide with consent but of homicide defined in Art. 574 (Art. 575 of the Code-
general provision on homicide)."
137. See notes 69, 70 supra.
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But most laws maintain the total separateness of the latter
crime.13 In Germany, until recently, the independence of "homicide
upon request" -1 was expressed in the rule whereby in a conviction of
such homicide mitigating circumstances could not be considered, 40 so
that the euthanasia motive, an extenuating factor, could not be relied
upon in addition to the request.141 This position has been amended by
recent legislation.142 At present, "homicide upon request" is no longer
a crime sui generis, but rather a special instance of the general law of
homicide." The German position is now clarified by inclusion of ex-
press provisions for reduction of penalty in the case of mitigating cir-
cumstances and for the punishment of attempt.
138. With respect to the Italian provision, Saltelli and Romano-Di Falco state:
"The homicide of a consenting person is an autonomous juristic notion. Attempt and
participation of several persons are possible." SALTELLI & ROMANO-DI FALCO, op.
cit. supra note 116, at 254. The provision of the Italian Code is very specific. It
reads thus:
"Whoever causes the death of another with the latter's consent shall be punished
by confinement from six to fifteen years.
"The aggravating circumstances indicated in Article 61 are not applicable.
"The provisions with regard to homicide are applicable if the act was com-
mitted:
1. against a person less than eighteen years of age,
2. against a mentally defective person or a person who is in a state of
psychological deficiency caused by another infirmity or by abuse of alcohol
or of drugs,
3. against a person whose consent has been extorted by the guilty person by
violence, threat or influence [suggestione], or obtained by deceit." ITALIAN
PENAL CODE art. 579.
139. GEkMAN PENAL CODE §216 (text of Sept. 1, 1953), B.G. B1. pt. 1, at 1083,
reads as follows:
"(1) Where a person has been induced to kill another by the express and
earnest request of the deceased, imprisonment for not less than three years shall
be imposed.
"(2) Where there are extenuating circumstances, the punishment shall be im-
prisonment for not less than six months.
"(3) The attempt is punishable."
Subdivision (2) has been added by amendment of Aug. 25, 1953. Subdivision
(3) was formerly subdivision 2, added by amendment of May 29, 1943, R.G. Bl. pt.
I, at 340, but after the collapse of the Nazi regime it was dubious whether this
amendment was in force. See SCHoENFELDER, DEUTSCHE GEsETZE, note to §216.
140. This was the prevailing opinion. See v. LisZT, LEHRBuc DES DEuTSCHEN
STAXRECHTs 296-97 (21st & 22nd completely rev. ed. 1919); OLSHAUSEN,
KOmMENTAR ZUM STRAFGESETZBUCH 997 (12th completely rev. ed. 1944) ;
KLENNER, op. cit. supra note 70, at 40-41 ; ENGIScH, op. cit. supra note 5, at 16. It
was upheld by the Bundesgerichtshof, Feb. 7, 1952, 2 B.G.H. St. 258. There the
court said that "homicide upon request" is not a special instance of murder or man-
slaughter, but a crime sui genwris, and that, for this reason, the provision on miti-
gating circumstances in homicide cases (§ 213) does not apply to it.
141. As to attempt to commit homicide upon request, the prevailing opinion was
that, until 1943, it was not subject to punishment, homicide upon request being, as is
mostly assumed, a "minor crime" (Vergehen). Compare GERMAN PENAL CODE
§ 43(2).
142. See GEMaAN PENAL CODE § 216(2), [1953] B.G. B1. pt. 1, at 1083.
143. See Dreher, supra note 40; Lange, supra note 53.
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As now conceived, the German law of homicide constitutes a well
integrated unit. As murder is merely an aggravated type of man-
slaughter, so homicide upon request is merely a milder type. Flexibility
is achieved by the fact that, under special circumstances, punishment for
murder and manslaughter on the one hand, and for manslaughter and
homicide upon request on the other hand, may be the same. Thus, in
aggravated cases, a "manslayer" may be subject, like a "murderer," to
life confinement in a penitentiary.' In the case of mitigating circum-
stances, the minimum sentence for "manslaughter" and "homicide upon
request," as newly amended, is the same--six months imprisonment.145
In Swiss law, "homicide upon request" is treated as an exceptional
instance of intentional homicide. 4" The actor's motivation by the vic-
tim's request is stressed. 4 7 This is evidenced by the fact that an ac-
cused who erroneously believed that a request was made comes within
the provision for "homicide upon request." '48 Of course, since the kill-
ing is intentional, where the belief was based on negligence, he may not
further benefit from the special provision for negligent killing.'49
144. Compare GERMAN PENAL CODE § 212(2), supra note 50; § 211 (1), supra.
note 49.
145. Compare GERMAN PENAL CoDE § 213, supra note 61; § 216(2), supra note
139.
146. Article 114 of the Swiss PENA. CoDE art. 114, defines homicide upon re-
quest as follows:
'Whoever kills another upon the latter's earnest and urgent request is punish-
able by imprisonment."
147. This does not appear to be the case in Germany, where the Bundesgerichtshof
pointed out that "in the case of homicide upon request, the actor may, in addition,
act out of greed, out of another base motive or with cruelty." 2 B.G.H. St. 258, 259.
148. This is based on the Swiss doctrine of mistake of fact, thus defined in Article
19 out of the Penal Code ("Erroneous conception of facts") :
'Where a person has acted upon an erroneous conception of the factual situation,
he will be judged in accordance with the factual situation as conceived by him when
it works to his advantage.
'Where the actor could have avoided the mistake had he exercised the required
care, he is punishable for negligence, provided that negligent performance of the
act is subject to punishment."
In Germany the authorities are not agreed whether or not an erroneous assump-
tion that a request was made is relevant. See ILENNER, op. cit. supra note 70, at
34. This is due to the narrow wording of § 59 of the Penal Code which deals with
mistake of fact:
"(1) Where a person, in committing an offense, did not know of the existence
of circumstances which, under the statutory definition of crime, are part of the
factual conditions of punishment or increase punishment, he shall not be charged with
such circumstances.
"(2) This provision applies to offenses committed by negligence only in cases
where the ignorance itself has not been caused by negligence."
149. See Germann, op. cit. supra note 60, at 183 et seq., 227.
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While in Italy mere "consent" is sufficient to classify an act as
"homicide with consent," 1, as the crime is described in that country,
in other countries there must be an express "request" emanating from
the victim. Thus, in Germany, killing with the mere consent of the
victim is common homicide. 5 ' In the Chinese Penal Code of 1912 a
different penalty was prescribed for "homicide upon request" and
"homicide with consent." '" The former, like assistance in suicide,
was punishable by imprisonment from two months to five years; the
latter, like instigation of suicide, was punishable by imprisonment from
one year to ten years. 53
The requirements of a relevant "request" are most stringent. The
request must be "express and earnest" "' (Germany) or "earnest and
urgent" '" (Switzerland). It may be deemed "express" although it was
conveyed not by words but rather by gestures which, however, must
be unequivocal. 5 " A request expressed in the heat of passion is not re-
garded as "earnest." It is considered as "urgent" particularly when it
is repeatedly expressed. 5'
Of course, a request or a consent cannot be deemed relevant unless
the person who expresses it is in possession of mental capacity. In
Switzerland this is understood in a relative sense, i.e., he must be ca-
pable of grasping the import of the request and be aware of its con-
sequences. But the mere fact that a person is mentally ill does not
exclude possession of the required capacity of judgment. For instance,
a patient in the initial state of general paresis, who is aware of his con-
dition and knows the consequences of a response to his request, may
express a valid request. Whether or not the request is plausible, in
the light of the circumstances and the opinions of the requesting person
150. In Italy, this special crime has a distinctive name, "omicidio del con-
senziente." The reasons for holding consent sufficient to justify application of the
special provision are stated in the report of the Keeper of the Seals:
"It has been proposed that the rule be formulated differently, restricting the
special crime to the case of a true and proper request of the victim, manifested with
insistence. . . . I thought that proof of an express request of the victim would be
exceedingly difficult to adduce and that it would be almost impossible to prove an
insistence overcoming, beyond doubt, the hesitation and uncertainty of the guilty
person." SmALrEI. & ROMANo-DI FALcO, op. cit. supra note 116.
151. This is the prevailing opinion. See KLENNER, Op. cit. supra note 70, at 27.
"The first suggestion may have come from the actor, but it is not sufficient to show
that the deceased merely approved of the actor's intention which was known to him,
that he only agreed, or that his will was not contrary to that of the actor." [1945]
R.G.D.R. 21.
152. See note 111 supra.
153. For the 1935 version, see note 113 mipra.
154. See note 139 supra.
155. See note 146 supra.
156. See SCHoENx, op. cit. supra note 33, at 579.
157. GERMANN, op. cit. supra note 60, at 227.
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and his environment, may be evidentiary of his judgment capacity. 5
In Poland persons whom the law regards as generally incompetent I"
are deemed incapable of expressing a relevant request. For the same
reason, no significance is attributed to the request of a child under the
age of thirteen, while in the case of minors under the age of seventeen,
the relevancy of a request depends upon the mental development of
the individual."°
In order to evaluate fully the attitude of a particular legal system
to homicide upon request or with consent, it may be helpful to compare
the penalty provided for that crime with that imposed upon related
acts, such as instigating or assisting suicide. Such comparison must
fail in the case of legal systems, such as the German one, which on
purely technical grounds impose no penalty whatever on instigating
or assisting suicide. In the Swiss Code the penalty for instigating
or assisting suicide is heavier than that for killing upon request.1 1 But
it should be remembered that in Switzerland an accessory to suicide is
punishable only if his motive was selfish. In Poland, the mercy killer
upon request and the accessory to suicide are subject to the same maxi-
mum punishment, which is, at the same time, the minimum punishment
for homicide.' 2 In Italy, the punishment for "homicide with consent"
is confinement from six to fifteen years, while that for instigation of,
or assistance in, suicide is confinement from five to twelve years."o  In
Austria, homicide upon express and earnest request of the deceased is
a major crime punishable by confinement in a penitentiary from five to
ten years, whereas the punishment for assistance in suicide, except in
cases of "particularly aggravating circumstances," is only from one to
five years.'0 4 The Japanese Penal Code of 1907 treated homicide upon
request, homicide with consent, and instigation of suicide alikeY1 It
imposed no penalty whatever on assistance in suicide, and the reasons
for that were not merely technical. As amended, the Code now in-
158. Ibid.
159. POLISH PENAL CODE art. 17, § 1 (1932).
160. This follows from POLISH PENAL CODE art. 69, § 1 (1932). See MAK.APX-
wicz, op. cit. supra note 75, comment to art. 227.
161. See notes 107, 146 supra.
162. The punishment for homicide upon request is imprisonment up to five
years or detention (POLISH PENAL CODE art. 227 (1932)); that for accomplices in
suicide is imprisonment up to five years (id. art. 228). The section on homicide,
id. art. 225, § 1, provides:
'Whoever kills a person is punishable by imprisonment for not less than five years
or by imprisonment for life or by death."
163. Compare ITAIAN PENAL CODE arts. 579, 580; text quoted in'notes 138,
109 supra.
164. Ausr8IAx PE.NA. CODE § 139a, b; see note 105 supra.
165. See KLENER, op. cit. supra note 70, at 74-75.
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cludes assistance in suicide in the group of the enumerated offenses. 6 '
The Chinese Penal Code of 1912 imposed upon homicide with consent
and instigation of suicide a heavier penalty than upon homicide upon
request and assistance in suicide. The Code of 1935 imposes the same
penalty upon all these crime categories.
6 7
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This Article does not purport to contribute to the controversy over
the ethical justification of euthanasia. Its aim is rather to acquaint the
American lawyer with the manner in which foreign legislation solves
certain intricate legal problems which also arise within the framework
of American law. Moreover, the pattern of continental European leg-
islation must not be understood as a definite source of solution for
American legal problems. Indeed, in some respects the comparison of
American with continental European legal ideas serves to point out
the distinctiveness of the former and to suggest the necessity for self-
restraint inherent in our particular system of jurisprudence. However,
once it is realized, in studying foreign legislation, that euthanasia might
be accorded a more lenient treatment than other cases of premeditated
homicide, an opening is made for consideration of other, perhaps less
dramatic but nevertheless equally deserving, distinctions based on
motive.' 68
Where premeditation and deliberation is no longer an exclusive
test of the gravest type of homicide, and motive is, in principle, ac-
cepted as a substantive element of certain types of crime, the problem
facing the legislator is to select the most appropriate legislative tech-
nique whereby homicide cases may be diversified on the ground of their
distinctive motives. Two approaches are possible. The legislator may
vest in judges a broad discretion in classifying cases within the various
types of homicide; or he may enumerate in the statutes particularly rep-
rehensible motives or motives deserving exceptional treatment, as ag-
gravating or mitigating factors, which bring the respective acts within
the graver or within the milder type of homicide. The two approaches
may be combined in various forms of statutory schemes. The example
of euthanasia, as treated in the several statutory systems, shows how
the different statutory schemes affect a particular situation. Thus,
under the law of Germany and Switzerland, mercy killing does not fall
within the classification of murder. In Germany this is due to the fact
166. See note 112 supra.
167. See note 113 supra.
168. This may afford a basis for distinguishing cases such as Fisher v. United
States, 328 U.S. 463 (1946), from murder committed out of greed.
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that mercy is not one of the enumerated motives (or manners of per-
formance) which bring a killer within the category of a "murderer."
In Switzerland the same result follows from the fact that judges will
hardly classify a mercy killing within the general description of "show-
ing a particularly reprehensible attitude" of the actor, constituting mur-
der. In addition, there are in many countries special statutory forms
of homicide punishable less severely than ordinary homicide. They
may or may not expressly include the mercy motive as a substantive
element in the statute.
The example of euthanasia, as compared to assistance in suicide
and homicide upon request, shows that where there is a close relation-
ship in fact between the various forms of acts it is desirable that they be
treated as a class, and 'thus suggests that a penal code should be con-
ceived as a "system" of criminal law rather than as a loose collection
of incoherent criminal provisions, and, finally, indicates that similarity
of motive should be considered systematically as a factor uniting the
pertinent provisions.
A summary description of the manner in which euthanasia cases
are treated in this country and in England shows how failure to con-
sider the ethical relevance of motive in criminal law results in circum-
vention of legal provisions, lack of uniformity of adjudication, and
public dissatisfaction.
Since throughout this paper euthanasia has served as a background
of discussion, it is appropriate to devote several remarks to the specific
problem it presents, in addition to the more general issue which its
example raises. Euthanasia is not always regarded as merely an in-
stance of homicide. It has been variously suggested that it should be
entirely exempted from the system of penal law, that, indeed, the prac-
tice should be declared lawful within narrow and clearly defined limits.
As compared to the alternative method of according to euthanasia a
special place in criminal law, that is, the method of reducing the penalty
of homicide below the otherwise applicable measure where the actor
was motivated by mercy, legalization of euthanasia undoubtedly would
afford certain advantages. The principle of complete immunity of
mercy killing lends itself to subjection of the practice to state supervision
or control. A procedure may be devised for judicial safeguards against
abuse." 9 Judge Learned Hand suggested that, while euthanasia is
169. Such procedure was devised in a bill legalizing euthanasia proposed by the
Euthanasia Society. The American Advisory Council of the Euthanasia Society
prepared a proposal to be submitted to the New York State Assembly, known as
"The Proposed Bill to Legalize Euthanasia"' Senator Comstock as early as 1937
introduced into the Nebraska Assembly his own bill for legalizing voluntary
euthanasia. See SULLIVAN, THE MoRALrrY op MERcy KLLING (1950).
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objectionable to the majority of virtuous persons in this country as
long as it remains in private hands, the current moral feeling as to
legally administered euthanasia might be different.' Different, not
because virtuous persons generally adhere to the Socratic tenet that ab-
solute obedience to the law is a requirement of morality, but because
they generally believe that the law alone can furnish anything like
adequate safeguards against abuse. On the other hand, however, the
method of reducing the penalty of homicide in the case of mercy killing
has the advantage of not being objectionable from a religious point of
view. For religions do not deny that there are degrees of sin or guilt
depending on the underlying motive and that punishment ought to be
differentiated in accordance with these.
In trying to find the proper solution, consideration should be given
to the prevailing mores of American society.' State controlled eutha-
nasia is predicated upon ethical approval of the act. Reduction of pen-
alty in the case of homicide motivated by mercy merely presupposes
the assumption that such act is less reprehensible than ordinary acts
of homicide. There is no evidence that the majority of the American
people approve of euthanasia, but it is reasonable to assume that most
people consider a killing motivated by mercy less reprehensible than
killing for a base motive. Thus, a specific statutory reduction of penalty
for mercy killing would seem to be the most appropriate solution. The
European experience with the separate crime of "homicide upon re-
quest" does not warrant apprehension of abuse. Before the enactment
of the Federal Swiss Penal Code, the penal codes of six Swiss cantons
recognized that type of crime as distinct from ordinary homicide. In
1937, Hafter noted that no convictions of that crime were reported
from any of the six cantons.'7 Of course, the danger of abuse would
be further decreased by addition of the qualifying fact of incurable ill-
ness of the deceased.
In planning a reform of the law on euthanasia, utmost discrimina-
tion is of the essence. The present writer firmly believes that no con-
sideration whatever should be given to euthanasia where it is admin-
istered for the benefit of a person or persons other than the suffering
patient. This belief is based on the tenet of the equal value of all human
beings, which bars the sacrifice of one individual, however useless and
burdensome, for the benefit of another or others, however useful.
It is further believed most important to differentiate euthanasia
administered upon request or with consent of the patient from eutha-
170. Repouille v. United States, 165 F.2d 152, 153 (2d Cir. 1947).
171. A sound project of law reform should also take adequate account of pre-
existing law. Legal continuity should not be completely disrupted.
172. HIaFR, SCHWMZERISCHES STRAFRECHT 23-24 (Besonderer Teil 1937).
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nasia performed without such consent. True, as may be recalled, a
judge and a jury had shown exceptional sympathy for Repouille, whose
act consisted in the killing of a hopelessly ill, mentally defective child
unable to consent to his own destruction. 173 It is also true that acts of
that nature fall within the most progressive, special statutory provision
in Norway. The fact remains that there is a profound moral difference
between euthanasia administered at the patient's own request and acts
done of the actor's "own head." Indeed, it may be argued that mercy
killing without consent or request in cases where the patient is capable
of expressing a relevant will should receive no special consideration
whatever. The Norwegian law draws a distinction between mercy
killing upon request and mercy killing without such request. The
penalty imposed upon the latter is heavier. Perhaps it may be advisable
to follow this Norwegian pattern.
It may be also considered appropriate to impose a relatively
heavier penalty for cases where the actor instigated the patient's request,
as well as for cases where there has been mere consent rather than a
request. Such cases are comparable to those of instigating suicide,
whereas cases of compliance with the independent request of the de-
ceased rather resemble those of assistance in suicide. It is felt that
instigation is more reprehensible and more likely to be repeated than
mere assistance or compliance with a request.
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